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Military Affairs

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4 May 1994

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POLICY

Russian 1994 Defense Budget Evaluated

94UM0370A Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA* in Russian
No 14, Apr 94 (signed to press 5 Apr 94) pp 8-9

[Article by Vadim Makarenko: "Downsize Or Find Money?—In Order To Plug Up Holes in the Military Budget, We Will Have To Strip the Entire Country"]

[Text] The Ministry of Defense has requested R87.8 trillion for 1994. This figure is so surprisingly large that it is at first difficult to believe. We need only recall the funding requests of the agrarian sector to understand that growth of the role of the state in the Russian economy is not just words. After being coordinated within the government, however, this amount was reduced, along with the requests of other departments, and came to 46-47 percent of the original request. Now it is the parliament's turn.

Even in diminished form, the military budget will constitute about 20 percent of federal outlays, or about R36 trillion—10 times greater than the initial figure for the 1993 military budget.

This amount reflects real growth in military outlays by a factor of 1.5-2, and confirms the government's decisiveness not only to lay the hull of a new atomic submarine in Severomorsk, but to complete its construction as well (in addition to implementing other ambitious programs), which would be impossible in principle within the framework of the previous military budget. But it is virtually impossible within the framework of the present budget to attempt to reform the armed forces. There is little money available, Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev asserts.

The Ministry of Defense Is Not Fabricating Problems—There Are Quite Enough of Them

The fight for budget funds is heating up not only among departments, but within them as well. In the Ministry of Defense, for example, this is taking place among the services of the armed forces. Today due to the lack or inefficient use of funds, we are seeing a degradation of the Air Defense Forces and Navy.

The rare figures that have been appearing in the press reveal the outlines of a depressing picture of military decline. In particular, we see an accelerated reduction in the composition of the fleet: 548 ships and boats in 1992, 400 in 1993, 300 in the year 2000, and 191 in 2010. In the assessment of specialists, the level of combat readiness is exceedingly low.

In the Air Defense Forces, where the blunder with Rust in 1987 enabled a capital purge to be effected in the highest echelon of the Ministry of Defense, forces and weapons are 30-40 percent combat ready, and certain aircraft are plotted only after they have deeply penetrated Russian airspace.

It is only natural that such a state of the services and branches of service engenders friction among generals. Rumors are constantly circulating on the reduction, elimination, or formation of one department or another, directorate of the Ministry of Defense, branch of service, or even service of the Armed Forces. It would be advisable to draw up and adopt the Laws "On the Ministry of Defense" and "On the Authorized Structure and Strength of the Russian Armed Forces" so as to impede the endless, expensive, and often unjustified reorganization in the Armed Forces. Especially without the knowledge of legislators.

All the changes in the Armed Forces, including troop dislocations (and all of these absolutely demand money), must be provided for in the budget. The Ministry of Defense cannot arbitrarily expend the funds it obtains. Although it clearly does not have enough funds to accomplish the missions it has been assigned, it would be problematic to fight in favor of increasing the military budget without control by the State Duma and by society.

Just in recent years, almost 900 ground forces units of all sizes were redeployed, including nine military directorates, almost 30 divisions, and more than 45 brigades. This comprises more than 300,000 individuals, more than 8,000 tanks, about 9,000 armored vehicles, and about 5,000 artillery pieces. How much has this cost? The movement of a motorized rifle division requires 55 echelons, and railroad rates required the spending of R1.8 billion per thousand kilometers. But all the decisions of the Ministry of Defense were made and continue to be made without the participation of parliament.

The Military Budget of 1993 Was Small, But Constantly Increasing

In 1993 just 65 percent of the stated requirements of the Ministry of Defense were met.

True, this figure does not include off-budget funds of the Ministry of Defense (proceeds from the sale of equipment, real property, weapons, etc.). The Ministry of Defense reported receiving \$6.4 million and R6.5 billion into its accounts in 1993 from sales of released military assets (in addition to arms and ammunition sales).

But then the military budget grew over the course of the entire year. Whereas originally the amount was R3.5 trillion, after the recalculation in May it had grown to R5.3 trillion. In this regard, the budget of the Russian Armed Forces increased but did not outstrip inflation. It increased 2.35-fold in all over the year, amounting to R8.6 trillion. Will not the same story be repeated this year as well?

If we convert the figures to dollars, the Russian military budget in 1993 amounted to \$5-7 billion, the present budget—somewhere around \$10-12 billion. For our country the amount is quite small.

For example, the Russian Armed Forces are greater in numerical strength than those of the United States, but America's military expenditures in 1993 were about \$260 billion—Russia's outlays being less per individual serviceman by a factor of 45-50. This can lead us to a conclusion regarding the probable level of combat readiness of the Armed Forces independent of assurances by the minister of defense. And to the conclusion that since there are no further opportunities for increasing defense appropriations, we must therefore find ways to significantly downsize the Russian Army.

The Defense Ministry's Problems Will Not Go Away

Defense enterprises have been operating for three months now in this new year, but who decided when as to what production they would deliver to the Russian Armed Forces in 1994? Does the Security Council have such authority—examining on 19 January, after the State Duma began its work, the issue of programs for the development and production of prospective varieties of armament and military equipment? According to the Constitution—it does not. Will we not once again be forced to effect payment out of a budget not approved by the parliament, and approve it after the fact?

But even our country's government (the executive organ, whose principle members are also members of the Security Council) presented a draft military budget enabling defense requisitions for 1994 to be financed for one quarter only.

There are no legal foundations for military equipment payments and other item outlays, and whether or not we pay for them depends on our officials.

Last year the financing effected by the Ministry of Defense was done in small portions (about 150 times), funds being obtained each time only after conduct of a battle—from whence proceed our endless nonpayments crises. The situation is repeating itself again this year.

The Great Secret of the Military Budget

Just as was the case during the times of stagnation, to date we do not know the size or the structure of military outlays. This prevents any supervision of the activity of the Armed Forces.

The more visible the size of the military budget—which absolutely must be compared with expenditures on education, public health, and science—the more scrupulously legislators will examine where, how, and why the people's money is being spent. They will "stick their noses" more frequently into military matters.

After all, in essence it is only through control of the budget that deputies will be able to control the activity of the executive authority. The less detailed the budget is, therefore, the better it will be for officials of the Ministry of Defense.

In most countries, the draft budget, and the draft military budget in particular—insofar as this accounts for

about a third of state budgetary outlays, is published six to eight months prior to its adoption, and it is then thoroughly studied and discussed by the public and by parliamentarians. It is incomprehensible why we are unable to adhere to this practice, especially since the Ministry of Defense is not hiding this information from our new partners and opponents, but from our own public opinion. The Law on State Secrets (Article 5) assists in this regard. This law permits the classification as secret of information "concerning the volumes and plans (goals) of state requisitions, output and deliveries (in monetary and physical terms) of arms, military equipment, and other defense production output..." Perhaps it is for this reason that discussion of the arms production program took place behind closed doors in the Security Council, where even the minister of finance and academician Mikhail Maley, one of the ideologues of conversion, were not permitted access.

The clearly unsuccessful experience of the fight for appropriations this year will perhaps cause leaders of the Ministry of Defense to see that the candid discussion of military problems should not be circumvented. The view exists that it would be advisable to submit at least the rough outlines of the draft military budget for 1995—today.

Ministry Statement on Russian Bases in Near Abroad

94UM0372B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 8 Apr 94 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Statement of the Ministry of Defense of Russia"]

[Text] In connection with the publication in the mass media of Directive No 174-rp from the president of the Russian Federation on 5 April 1994 on Russian military bases in the territory of states that are former republics of the USSR, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation considers it necessary to make the following statements.

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation never planned and is not planning any military bases in the territory of Latvia or to test new weapons and military equipment there. A document prepared by the Ministry of Defense together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs speaks of the establishment of Russian military bases and facilities in the territories of the former republics of the USSR on the basis of military formations of the Armed Forces of Russia in the interests of guaranteeing the security of the Russian Federation and these states. It was not a matter of the establishment of a military base but an SPRN [missile attack warning system] facility in Skrunda, about which there are presently negotiations with the Latvian side. The president's directive to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs together with the Ministry of Defense of Russia and other interested ministries and

departments proposed the continuation of the process of negotiations on this matter with states participating in the CIS and with Latvia.

Grachev: PVO to Be Retained as Branch of Service

94UM0372A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Aleksandr Ivanov: "PVO Forces Retained as a Branch of the Armed Services"]

[Text] Taking into account the tendency toward the priority development of the forces and weapons for aerospace attack and the associated possible threat to Russia, the president of the Russian Federation, the government, and the Ministry of Defense attach particular importance to the further improvement of the PVO [air defense] Forces.

At a solemn assembly in honor of the Day of the Air Defense Forces, Minister of Defense Army Gen. Pavl Grachev emphasized in particular: The Air Defense Forces, which quite justifiably can be classified among the elite forces, will be retained as a branch of the armed forces, and will be perfected. Moreover, they will serve as a basis for the establishment of the system for the aerospace defense of Russia.

GROUND TROOPS

ARS-15 Decontamination Vehicle

94UM0379B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Vladimir Berezko, under the rubric: "Arsenal": "This Vehicle Is Able To Do A Lot"]

[Text] At first glance at the decontamination vehicle which has been in the inventory of the chemical troops for many years, it seems that there is nothing interesting in it, it is just a "decontamination vehicle"—pipes, valves, and pumps. But if you examine it more closely?

The latest model of the ARS-15 Decontamination Vehicle is designed for chemical decontamination, radiological decontamination and biological decontamination of weapons and vehicles, and chemical decontamination and biological decontamination of sectors of terrain and roads. Furthermore, it is utilized for temporary storage and transportation of liquids, charging various tanks and decontamination gear with those liquids, heating water and water solutions, decontamination of personnel and extinguishing fires. The decontamination vehicle consists of a "Ural"-375 truck, a tank, a heater, a TsN-245 mechanical pump, and decontamination equipment.

The ATS-15 is not distinguished from its predecessor—the famous ARS-14—but it has a number of substantial

advantages over it. If the ARS-14 could operate normally only at positive temperatures, the ARS-15 permits operation with water (!) solutions at temperatures of up to -15, -20°C.

The heater provides the vehicle with hot water at up to 80°C and with hot air to heat the pipelines.

One more innovation: The pump, the "heart" of the vehicle, is made from titanium. The valves are also made from titanium.

Technical Specifications of the ARS-15

Equipment decontamination capacity	Up to 12 pieces of equipment per hour (the capacity of the ARS-14 was 6-8 pieces per hour)
Processing capability with one charge	From 23 to 150 pieces of equipment
Tank Capacity	3,200 liters
Number of work stations serviced simultaneously	12
Time to heat the water in the tank up to 70°C	1 hour
Deployment time	15 minutes
Crew	3 men
Series production	Since 1983

NAVAL FORCES

Talks With Poland On Free Passage Into Vilensk Continue

94UM0357C Kaliningrad STRAZH BALTIKI in Russian 22 Feb 94 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Vilensk Gulf Could Become Accessible to Third Countries' Ships"]

[Text] A Kaliningrad Oblast delegation that took part in the latest (fourth) round of Russian-Polish talks on navigation in the Vilensk Gulf has returned from Moscow.

Delegation member Yu. Rozhkov-Yuryevskiy, deputy chief of the International Affairs Administration, told STRAZH BALTIKI that the Polish side had raised the question of unimpeded passage for third countries' ships through the Baltiysk Canal and the Russian part of the Vilensk Gulf. Meanwhile, as Yu. Rozhkov-Yuryevskiy explained, entry into and exit from the Vilensk Gulf has been systematized, and free passage through the canal is very relative. The interests of the Baltic Fleet must be taken into account here. A second problem consists in that a feasibility study regarding such navigation has not been completed yet. However, such a study should be ready within five months, and the sides will exchange the findings of their work on June 1.

Importance Of Continued Naval Construction Stressed

94UM0357B Kaliningrad STRAZH BALTIKI
in Russian 22 Feb 94 pp 1-2

[Gennadiy Petrovich Voronin, deputy chairman of Russian State Committee on Defense Industries, interviewed by Vladimir Gundarov: "Russia's Naval Prestige Must Not Fall Below 'Red' Mark"]

[Text] Gennadiy Petrovich Voronin is a member of the International Engineering Academy, a doctor of economics, a member of the British Academy of Naval Engineers, a Russian meritorious machinery builder, a state prize winner, and deputy chairman of the Russian Federation State Committee on Defense Industries.

[Gundarov] Gennadiy Petrovich, you have devoted your entire life to shipbuilding and know very well all the ups and downs in the history of the Russian Navy. What stage, in your opinion, is it going through now?

[Voronin] It is of course experiencing a downturn. The things we must do to overcome this phase in accordance with the new military doctrine—better quality with fewer personnel, so to speak—takes time. And not enough time has gone by yet for the Fleet to acquire new qualities—that is, for it to obtain new precision weapons, better ships and control systems, and so forth. In a broader sense, we do not have the kind of military hardware program for 10 to 15 years into the future that we used to have.

[Gundarov] How much longer will we have to wait for it?

[Voronin] We have already been waiting for it for 18 months. It has now been drafted and received preliminary approval, but it is not yet an official document that can be sent to our shipyards. I think it will be confirmed in the first quarter of this year. But a program is not a dogma. It will obviously undergo further adjustments, hopefully in the direction of increasing the Fleet's combat power.

[Gundarov] It has often been said in the press that the current cutbacks in naval ships is a consequence of not only the geopolitical breakup of the USSR and economic crisis in Russia, but also of mistakes made in formulating earlier shipbuilding programs.

[Voronin] In hindsight one can question and criticize anything. For example, many say that we shouldn't have built aircraft-carrying ships, that they were too costly. But what is ever cheap? At that historical stage, given the military doctrine in existence and the confrontation with NATO and the United States in particular, our shipbuilding program, which spanned the period up to 2000, was correct, in my opinion. It was drafted and confirmed by the collegiums of various ministries—defense, shipbuilding, and others.

I don't deny that mistakes are made in any undertaking. We sometimes philosophize that everything should be

decided in a collegial fashion, by various oblast committees, councils, and collegiums. Nevertheless, the role of individuals, I think, will always influence specific decisions. I recently went to America and Britain and saw how things are done in those countries. There the role of the individual is simply striking, judging from actual deeds. But outwardly the role is less apparent, perhaps for the reason that people there have greater freedom.

[Gundarov] We are now in Russia, where there have always been people who prefer certain types of ships. And so it would be interesting to find out what kinds of ships you prefer.

[Voronin] I prefer the Fleet as a whole. I have closely studied the doctrine of the US Navy. Its combat effectiveness is supposed to double by 2000. And not as a result of the number of ships, but through the quality of new weapons and power systems—in short, through research and development. Everything there is solved in an integrated fashion. At the same time, it should be pointed out that many countries have taken the path of building small aircraft carriers designed to handle 15 to 20 Harrier jets. I think we too should have such aircraft carriers in the Northern and Pacific Fleets. They could be built in St. Petersburg or Severodvinsk. The facilities for them are available.

But I am concerned by the fact that the Americans are currently hard at work, while we are not. We have launched a project to salvage old ships and submarines. But the United States has essentially stopped salvaging operations and begun converting old ships into training vessels. And such ships can be made combat-ready again in one or two months.

[Gundarov] Do you believe that?

[Voronin] It's hard to believe 100 percent in anything. But I know that such work is under way. I don't think that they could turn all old ships into training vessels, but in our country we often write off even rather "fresh" ships.

[Gundarov] Like the aircraft-carrying cruiser Kiev?

[Voronin] Its fate has not been decided, but it is foreordained.

[Gundarov] Why can't we take the same route as the Americans?

[Voronin] We are probably hindered by some sort of "special Russian gene pool." We are always trying to save something and never invest in anything. We haven't begun construction of a single surface ship in the past two years. But the problem of maintaining older ships isn't being solved either. So far we have "stoked up" only the salvaging of submarines, because shipyards that have no other orders have grasped it like straw.

[Gundarov] What awaits the Fleet in the near future?

[Voronin] We have drawn up a program spanning the period up to 2003 that takes into account of the requirements of the new military doctrine. The program is based primarily on the actual situation in industry. Each shipyard has a so-called "red" engineering mark below which it must not fall in order to avoid ruining production sectors. The fact is that conversion is several times greater than its initially planned scope. For example, we have enterprises whose basic production has declined by 80% in one year. In this situation no economic formulas are operative. Therefore, in developing the economic program, we proceeded from the task of maintaining production. But even our minimum program, as it turns out, is quadruple the Defense Ministry's budget. I know that the Defense Ministry is currently battling with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economics. But to avoid total collapse, we are forced to take some risks—to set up production of new systems, instruments, and units without official documents for them.

[Gundarov] Aren't you afraid that about five years down the road you'll come into criticism for building ships without a program and for making more mistakes?

[Voronin] I'm afraid of something else—that we will be accused of sitting around idly. For research cannot be stopped, nor should it be. We know what a potential adversary is working on and how, how this process is proceeding throughout the world, what sorts of new systems and technologies are being developed. And, of course, we too are forced to engage in such work, but with our eyes closed, as it turned out.

[Gundarov] Wouldn't it be better to work with our eyes open, if only on the basis of the minimum program?

[Voronin] I don't want to disclose all our secrets. I will only say that an enterprise that has succeeded in entering the foreign market and earning profits in dollars is using those profits not for its social needs, but to accomplish state objectives, including with respect to research and development. It's hard for us to compete with the Japanese, who now have fifth-generation electronics in production—molecular electronics and biocomputers. But we should at least be keeping abreast of what's going on. Regardless of whether the new parliament gives us money or not. That's life.

[Gundarov] The politicians say Russia has no enemies today. So perhaps the need for intensive construction of new ships has receded as well.

[Voronin] I am sometimes asked a simple "peasant" question: Why are American submarines plying the waters off Severodvinsk, while we have no submarines in their territory? Moreover, the opposing side refuses to hold any talks on cutting naval forces, considering itself a great sea power and guarantor of peace. And the United States isn't the only country watching over its fleet. China has now embarked on an unprecedented program to build up its naval forces. Hundreds of representatives of various forms and departments in that country come to us. I have met with many of them and

drawn the conclusion that they have set the task of making their country a major naval power in the near future. I recently visited South Korea, where I met with the president of the Hala firm. They intend to build a new shipyard on the cutting edge of technology within 18 months. South Korea currently ranks second in the world in shipbuilding and will probably rank first in the near future. Even a small country like that intends to start building submarines, albeit diesel-powered ones at first. But China is already interested in nuclear submarines. These two countries' strategy is to invest enormous amounts of money in their naval forces. We have already sensed this in the course of business contacts.

[Gundarov] Do you see a desire on the part of our government to maintain Russia's naval power?

[Voronin] No. As is often the case, words are at variance with deeds. Judging from the state order that shipbuilders now have, our main clients are foreigners, not our own Defense Ministry: 40 percent of all Russian shipyard capacity is starting to work for the West.

[Gundarov] In that case, what awaits the industrial complex that serve the Russian Navy?

[Voronin] We are waiting for the state to pay its debts to shipbuilders. I will cite just one figure. The state owes the Sevmas Production Association 130 billion rubles. It has been promising to pay us that money for several months, but the debt remains. Consequently, the enterprise has no working capital and the production chain is being destroyed. In short, these are all simple truths about which much has already been said.

[Gundarov] Do you have specific proposals for maintaining production?

[Voronin] The situation is compounded by the fact that conversion programs seemingly exist, but they are not being carried out because there is no funding for them. We are therefore drafting not proposals, but specific subprograms of each shipyard. They no longer have any choice. They are willing to fill any orders, be they for rural enterprises, the oil or gas industry, or environmental needs.

[Gundarov] Is shipbuilding technology being destroyed in the process?

[Voronin] Yes, from the standpoint of shipbuilding technology, we are losing.

[Gundarov] Maybe this is a consequence of the fact that there is no Navy lobby in the government.

[Voronin] To some extent I agree with you. There are many lobbyists for various sectors. But where the Navy is concerned, I see no lobbyists for it. Yuriy Yarov knows more about the Navy's problems than anyone else in government. But he deals with other problems, unfortunately. And on the part of certain high government officials I sense no understanding of the tasks confronting the production complex that meets the Navy's

needs. This is because these people have no plant experience. We have now reached the point where no one wants to hear the exhortations of people with practical experience in various fields and they are called anti-reformers. But such people would not have made the huge mistakes in running industry that we see today. I think the personnel problem is the most pressing one today. Incidentally, I am for reforms, but they must be pursued in a more evolutionary way.

[Gundarov] I you had the power to change the situation in which the Navy finds itself, what would you do first?

[Voronin] That's like asking a mechanic at an garage what he would do first with a car that doesn't run. First he takes a look at it. If we start over again, I am convinced that industry can withstand five percent conversion, 10 percent at most. And foreign experience confirms this. When conversion is expanded, the production process becomes unmanageable, since it enters into conflict with science, with economics. And so it is hard to say what should be done first when everything has fallen apart.

Wars are raging throughout the world. The situation in the Mideast is difficult, and the tensions are rising in Asia. The American Fleet is out of the stopper. I think I would review the shipbuilding program and take a more cautious view of cutbacks in it. We can cut up obsolete ships that cannot be effective in a modern war. But we're cutting up ships that have served just 15 years instead of 25.

Second, whether we want to or not, we must not let our shipyards fall below the "red" mark. Otherwise, no edicts and orders will be able to keep production from collapsing.

[Gundarov] Gennadiy Petrovich, in conclusion, what would you as a shipbuilder like to wish our seamen in the new year?

[Voronin] It's hard to find more optimistic people that they are, even though, figuratively speaking, they're having to "fight" every day: During cruises, in their military service, during combat alert duty. I want to wish them the ability to keep that optimism forever. I am convinced that better times are in store for the Navy, because we have trump cards when it comes to being a naval power. And no political battles can take them away from us.

Problems With Dismantling Paldiski Training Center

94UM0376A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Vladimir Kaushanskiy, under the rubric: "Situation": "It Is Storming in Paldiski, and It Is Clearing in Obninsk... This Is Not a Fragment From the Weather

Forecasts. Although the Redeployment Is Also Linked With the Weather. Financial and Social. But People Create It"]

[Text] We encountered the admiral at not the best moment in his life. It was sooner the other way around—quite dramatic. And having just gotten off the "Tallin—Moscow" train, he immediately laid down a condition to me: "No more than 30 minutes for the interview. My day is scheduled down to the minute." And having touched his face with the characteristic gesture of a man with a beard, he said abruptly: "Yes and what can I say to you that is new? We are self-eliminators, murderers of our own past."

Perhaps the entire drama is contained in these words. You cannot define in any other way the situation in which Hero of the Soviet Union, Rear Admiral Aleksandr Olkhovikov has found himself by the will of fate. Rear Admiral Aleksandr Olkhovikov is chief of the 93rd Naval Training Center that is deployed in the center of the Estonian city of Paldiski. Prior to that, he commanded a nuclear submarine of the latest design and then a division of strategic missile submarines. And when he agreed to take his current post, Aleksandr Vasilyevich could not have imagined that he would not spend five years of service in Estonia or that the training center, like an expensive heart with its two nuclear reactors and super-modern shore training complex, would cease to exist. This December, the center will be 30 years old. The last crew of strategic submariners was trained at Paldiski in May 1992.

What now? Olkhovikov's concerns are a cart and a small handcart. Both nuclear reactors have been shut down and do not pose a danger. But the removal of the nuclear fuel and the worries associated with that...are a very complex problem and, in Baltic Fleet Commander Admiral Vladimir Yegorov's opinion, that problem has no equals in world practice. Under Olkhovikov's leadership, 250 Baltic Fleet specialists and a "team" from the Northern Fleet are struggling with it during the preparatory phase. The dismantling of the center's training facilities is also approaching completion. The redeployment time periods are strict, the Estonians (Olkhovikov had arrived in Moscow for the next meeting with them) are hurrying and pressing them along the entire negotiating field. Dozens of "aircraft" have already delivered canisters with equipment to the Paldiski seamen's new home—to the fleet training center in the Moscow suburb of Obninsk. Here they plan to conduct the training of nuclear submarine crews. And, as his Obninsk colleagues joke, soon their alma mater will become the capital of the Russian submarine fleet.

"My first envoys are already celebrating a housewarming in the Moscow suburbs," sighed Olkhovikov. "The next group is preparing for the trip. People have hope that their primary mission will not be changed."

"But what about your fate, Aleksandr Vasilyevich?"

Olkhovikov answered philosophically:

"In the navy, the captain is the last to leave the ship."

Does a lot have to be relocated now? Of course, this is a rhetorical question, all the more so in the background of the military department's catastrophic shortage of resources. Only faith and hope, primarily in themselves, remain free of charge. The Paldiski "move" has been painstakingly calculated by the entire navy world. Navy Combat Training Chief Vice Admiral Aleksandr Gorbunov, whom I contacted via telephone from Obninsk, Obninsk Center Chief Rear Admiral Vladimir Yamkov, and the engineers, financiers, and builders have weighed all of the "pro's" and "con's".

Only Siamese twins have two heads on one torso. Yes and that is from nature. It is significantly more complicated to combine two training structures that have divergent missions. But they are being combined. While taking into account that a strong collective of teachers has developed over many years near Moscow and the similar simulator systems and the general-purpose systems, on which you can rehearse the issues of tactics, command and control, and movement, will have a quite real impact for the Baltic Fleet seamen in the first stage of between-cruise training of crews...

Seeing is believing... Deputy Center Chief for Training Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Katomin set up the rolling of the sea for me. "My heart aches for Katomin," Admiral Yamkov told me. "The man is 50 years old. Formally, it is time to release him. But how can I be deprived of this submariner-scholar? By the way, Vladimir Fedorovich is the possessor of an award that is rare in these times: He was awarded the decoration of "Honored Specialist of the Armed Forces of the USSR" at the Kremlins' Georgiyevskiy Hall in May 1991.

The Navy does not have any equipment that is similar to what is here. With Katomin's help and using the unique simulators, I "submerged" into the ocean's depths, "negotiated" mine fields, simultaneously conducted ingenious computerized duels with several submarines and surface combatants, and "fought" for the submarine's survival among the fire, steam and water while admiring the creations of local skilled craftsmen. The electronics operated perfectly, creating that psychological fever pitch that is possible only in real cruises. And it equips specialists with professional baggage that is calculated on the highest crossbars. (Suffice it to note: As a rule, Obninsk "graduates" are winners of commander-in-chief's prizes for firing.) You simply can't rehearse such an enormous set of issues and you can't create the abundance of emergency situations—multimillions of expenditures—at sea under the current economic tension. Fire, sail, and improve your tactics as much as you want at Obninsk, without burdening yourself with concerns about ranges, the expenditure of resources, weapons, etc.

But today other concerns have accumulated at precisely this unique "port" in the Moscow suburbs. And not only the attendant circumstances that are associated with

"compression". It's time to modernize the training facility itself since the center's current computers are obsolete and at the end of their service life. The time has come to look to tomorrow, even though it is a muddled view due to the lack of money. The tactical simulator, which at one time cost R800,000 and paid for itself within four weeks to four months, has increased in price many times over. Hopes for industrial deliveries are illusory and the local skilled craftsmen, who developed the miracle systems during the era of stagnation, are currently left without improvised materials. And, while assembling the main command post for our Paldiski counterparts, we have been compelled to acquire even tin, soldering iron, and drills from our own more than meager resources. And, in the process, they dream of developing new simulators for the future unified center based upon the latest generation personal computers. God help us, we are relying on the wisdom of those people who hold the fate of the military budget in their hands: Russia without a modern nuclear submarine fleet is nonsense.

With the support of the Navy leadership, Admiral Yamkov and his "team" are not especially counting on a kind uncle. On the day of my arrival at the center, tests were occurring at full speed, the goal of which we can define as follows—on professional suitability for...independent teaching. Because they have convinced themselves: The high command positions in the fleet from which officer-submariners come to Obninsk still do not guarantee teaching skills. And therefore, be kind enough to take certification board tests on teaching, psychology and philosophy. All Paldiski servicemen, without exception, will have to obtain teaching "certificates", plus undergo mandatory testing in the psychological training and professional selection laboratory. The computer will impassively "register" a portrait of the officer based upon the criteria which perhaps even he himself did not even think about: Conscientiousness, diligence, an aptitude for conduct that is conducive to solving problems through mutual agreement, good will, sociability, an inclination toward risk, and indications of intellectually activity...

And how is the social portrait of the Paldiski servicemen being "registered"?

Admiral Vladimir Yamkov, Reserve Captain 1st Rank Valentin Murava and I arrived together at a reception for Obninsk Mayor Yuriy Kirillov. Both of these gentlemen consider the walls of the mayor's office to be home. And not without grounds. Yamkov is a member of the city directors council and he does not forget about seamen's needs while participating in the resolution of city problems. A former center chief engineer who has been released into the reserve, Murava himself has worked at the mayor's office and is quite familiar with the city's decision-making mechanisms on "military issues". (By the way, Kirillov is also not a guest among the seamen: He recently deemed it proper that his entire staff pass through the "professional suitability" laboratory).

Without these decisions, it would be impossible to perfect the "Paldiski variant". The Baltic Fleet seamen don't even dream about the services of, say, Turkish or German firms—builders. Not that region, but more precisely—a political apportionment. They relied only on the understanding and support of the local Russian authorities. Try to acquire territory for the new training-laboratory building, build a kindergarten in the microrayon, or new homes for yourselves without their approval. Or remodel a barracks into a family dormitory that previously belonged to military builders. Or erect a nine-story apartment building in which practically all of the first Paldiski seamen and their own persons on the waiting list have settled. The foundation for another apartment building has been laid in which some of the apartments will be provided to city residents.

Yes, there are problems. Yes, the military personnel have debts on payments. Yes, at times it seems to the city fathers that the submariner's appetites exceed the capabilities of the local authorities. But the main thing is that there is contact and mutual understanding and there is a readiness to compromise. And certainly the state view on the navy's future and on the city's future. The mayor also does not live only for today.

"I don't want KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers to form the impression that such altruistic fraternization of seamen and the city is occurring in Obninsk," Kirillov told me. "We are also calculating the variants. And not only financial. A powerful nuclear submariners' training center for "nuclear" Obninsk is a treasure. If you wish, in the future—these are excellent cadres for our job market. Who, besides them, will work in our NIIs [scientific research institutes], industrial enterprises, and VUZs [higher educational institutions] after their military service? The center's training algorithms will permit training people not only for the military fleet. The seamen's simulator complex and powerful computer facility provide chances to also grow specialists for floating nuclear electrical power plants and other complexes in which nuclear energy is utilized."

Having noted Admiral Yamkov's nod in agreement, Yuri Vasilyevich decided to express an idea which, judging by the later conversation, had matured long before our meeting.

"Well, the rest of the Paldiski seamen will arrive, they will find places to live, and the training process will begin. What next? In my view, in the future it will be worthwhile to think about changing the legal status of the already new, unified center. A military unit—that is one thing. But a federal training center for training nuclear submarine fleet specialists and increasing the skills of nuclear power workers—that is something quite different. That is already a higher educational institution, with its academic council, doctoral program and other attributes. This is already access to the near and far abroad and the opportunity for a qualitatively new level to conduct scientific-research and experimental-design

work, and to accept and fulfill orders. This is also the resolution of many problems of financing.

Does the mayor speak the truth? But then again, what he proposed is within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense and information for reflection for the Navy leadership. To calculate once again? And really, why not. It is difficult to survive on your own today.

And now the Paldiski seamen are celebrating their housewarmings in the new 9-story apartment building, they are becoming accustomed to the beautiful forest scenery, looking forward to nearby fishing and mushroom outings, and simply to communing with the marvelous nature of the Moscow suburbs. And male and female voices were wafting through the window of one of the apartments: "When the tired submarine leaves the depths for home..." Now they sail here in Obninsk "as a family". And we recalled the words of Admiral Olkhovikov, who has been compelled by force of circumstances to perform the role of guide today: "People now have hope..."

Continuing Threat Of Radiation From Sunken Komsomolets

94UM0357A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 7 Apr 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Andrey Bayduzhiy: "Komsomolets Submarine Sunk Five Years Ago: Today, in Rejecting NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Article About It, Officials Don't Shrink From Juggling Facts"]

[Text] Exactly five years ago, a fire resulted in the loss of the nuclear submarine Komsomolets in the Norwegian Sea. In addition to its nuclear reactor, the submarine also carried two nuclear torpedoes. On March 29, 1994, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA wrote that as a result of muddling and incompetence within the agency responsible for rendering the Komsomolets harmless, Russia is losing its last chance to avert a radiation disaster at the site where the submarine went down.

The military was the first to react to the article. The Navy Press Center, using the formulation "in connection with the appearance in certain mass media" (*after which, incidentally, there is a direct reference to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA—A.B.*) of articles about a sharp worsening of the radiation situation at the site where the nuclear submarine Komsomolets went down, released a statement asserting that radiation near the vessel remains "within the limits of background values." However, the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA article talked not about worsening radiation, but about the threatening state of the nuclear torpedo warheads aboard the Komsomolets and about the disastrous consequences that could arise in the near future if they are destroyed. These are two completely different things. Hence, one may conclude that the authors of the refutation either hadn't read the article they were refuting, or were attempting to deliberately juggle the facts cited therein. Or perhaps the Navy simply has nothing for its press

center to do. In that event our admirals might be advised to use the center to report about what is being done to prepare for the upcoming expedition to the site of the nuclear submarine Komsomolets, an expedition on which the Navy has a direct bearing. But the Navy command has absolutely nothing to boast about in this regard.

For example, as its chief evidence of environmental tranquillity at the site where the vessel went down, the press center cites readings taken by the hydrographic ship Semyon Dezhnev, which is in the region and "whose instruments make it possible to carry out highly accurate studies." However, the untenability of this argument consists in the fact that it is fundamentally impossible to ascertain the actual radiation picture around the submarine, which lies at a depth of 1,680 meters and in a region with an extremely complex hydrographic situation, from either a surface ship or by means of soundings. The only way to do this is to use the Mir deep-sea units, which last examined the Komsomolets in August 1993. For this reason, the Navy's assertions that all is calm in the Norwegian Sea are unconvincing. Even if all 400 curies of radioactive plutonium leaked from the torpedo warheads into the water a long time ago, it would still be impossible to detect them with the "highly accurate instruments" of the Semyon Dezhnev (whose presence at the site of the disaster is absolutely senseless from the standpoint of monitoring radiation, incidentally). Specialists cannot be unaware of this fact.

Attempts have been made to refute the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA article by not only the anonymous authors of the Navy Press Center statement. The newspaper published the article on the day that a memorandum of cooperation was signed between the Russian Ministry for Emergencies and the Dutch Komsomolets Memorial Foundation, which were mentioned in the article. Representatives of those organizations devoted a considerable portion of their time to explanations for the journalists who covered the meeting. Following the Navy Press Center's lead, the technique of refuting something that was never said was employed by Nikolay Nosov, deputy chief designer of the Rubin Central Design Bureau, who declared that the radiation situation at the site where the vessel went down was normal. When even senior officials annoyed by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA are so fond of changing the subject of the discussion of the Komsomolets problem to that of a "radiation situation in the Norwegian Sea that elicits no apprehension," one can prove that they are trying to mislead the public on this score. To do so, one need only cite several passages of a report issued by the Ministry of Defense Research Institute just two months ago on the findings of the summer (1993) expeditions to the site of the nuclear submarine Komsomolets.

"An analysis of the obtained data...and of water samples and samples of sorbents in bottom sediments made it possible to establish that **man-made radionuclides of uranium and plutonium** can be identified in the seawater

in the area near the nuclear warheads. Their concentrations **exceed the background values**, and the ratio of uranium-234 and uranium-238 **differs markedly from the natural ratio**.

"The conducted studies showed that a specific plutonium distribution is forming in the seawater in the area of the nuclear warheads: 90 percent of the **total quantity of plutonium being released** is being transformed into macrosols, while 10 percent remains in the form of microsols of colloidal particles and a solute portion. The macrosols are localized within the nuclear submarine's area in the near field, while the microsols **are being transported for long distances** and becoming segmented on bottom sediments.

"The **new form of plutonium existence** in the seawater that has been found at the accident site—macrosols...requires the development of a new unit for (its-A.B.) sampling."

The most interesting thing is that this document, which completely refutes Nikolay Nosov's statement, bears the signatures of three specialists, first of which is the name of Mr. Nosov himself! The secret of this double standard is simple: It is not only senseless for the specialists to lie, but also harmful for their own scholarly prestige. But doing so with respect to the public, in hopes that it will be incompetent, is quite permissible.

In attempting to refute NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, some officials of the Ministry for Emergencies are saying that the former Committee for Special Underwater Operations has been included in the ministry as a chief administration. Of the committee's 65 members, only one had been included on the Ministry for Emergencies staff up to that time, and only after the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA article did the ministry leadership begin registering its members as ministry employees, post-dating the documents in the process.

Spokesmen for the Ministry for Emergencies assert that in its two-year existence, the Committee for Special Underwater Operations achieved no successes and that its disbanding was fully justified. However, documents show that the committee existed for just over one year, and for less than nine months from the start of funding. As for its successes, it is thanks to the committee's efforts—even after the three-month period during which the Ministry for Emergencies' did nothing—that there is still a chance to avert a disaster in the Norwegian Sea. The committee not only organized an expedition to the Komsomolets during which, for the second time in world history (the first time was during the exploration of the Titanic) a deep-sea apparatus was able to penetrate inside the sunken vessel, but also devised a clear-cut plan of further actions and began placing orders for the manufacture of the required equipment with Russian enterprises.

Incidentally, Russian officials are not the only ones who must be given credit for inventiveness and an ability to fantasize; officials of the Dutch foundation must be

included here too. As its director, Rio Pranning, explained, after the Komsomolets the organization intends to turn its attention to four other nuclear vessels that have sunk in the world's oceans. At the same time, its plan for rendering the Komsomolets harmless is to be carried out in stages over a period of several years. And understandably so: It is by no means to the advantage of the foundation, which represents the interests of Dutch firms, to rapidly seal the vessel in the course of the summer of 1994 alone, and one is surprised that it has not proposed that the operation be extended over a period of 10 or even 100 years. From the standpoint of utilizing their capacity, this would be an almost ideal

operation for the Dutch enterprises. Nevertheless, a radiation disaster, should it occur, will have no effect on the security of the Netherlands.

If a massive emission of plutonium occurs in late 1994, and the data from the recent studies suggests that this is precisely what will happen, regardless of how much somebody might not like it—the consequences for Russia will be most disastrous. Fines paid to Norway and other countries alone will amount to hundreds of millions of dollars annually. And they will be paid by millions of Russian taxpayers.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Political Background of 'Selma' Controversy

94UM0373A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Valeriy Gromak: "Quiet at the Construction Site... 'Selma' Froze the Construction of Housing for Russian Servicemen in Kaliningrad"]

[Text] Just recently Lithuanian builders were working around the clock on the northern edge of Kaliningrad. Since 28 March, workers have not been coming from Lithuania, trucks have not been delivering panels to the construction site, and overhead cranes have been abandoned. The leadership of the "Selma" Building Association remained true to the statement that it made last Thursday to members of a Lithuanian government delegation. The vice president of the association, Povilas Ostasyavichius, did not hesitate to state at that time that the arrest of Vladas Laurinavichius, president of the "Selma" association, made it impossible for them to fulfill their contractual obligations.

I remind you that the president of the "Selma" association that has been building housing in Kaliningrad for Russian military personnel was arrested 17 March in Kaunas by Lithuanian special services at the very moment when he prepared to leave for Kaliningrad to meet with the minister of defense of Russia, Army Gen. Pavel Grachev, who brought with him a directive from Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin on the payment procedures for housing already built. Russia obligated itself to deliver crude oil to "Selma" in exchange for the housing.

It is still hard to say who is behind the provocation. I heard many versions in Vilnius. But almost all of them boiled down to one thing: As strange as it may seem, oil is responsible for everything. The fact is that when "Selma" settled accounts with the Government of Lithuania at the end of last year, it was reregistered in Russia. And now that it has received oil, it has become, as it were, a monopolist. Naturally certain groups are not pleased with this in Lithuania. Here is the opinion of Povilas Ostasyavichius, vice president of "Selma," about this:

"Recently certain forces have been unleashing a campaign to discredit the association, trying to show the project's disadvantageousness for the Lithuanian side. There were attempts to blame the association leadership of corruption. And when nothing came of this, the most ordinary methods of provocation went into action. Despite the fact that the order for the arrest of Laurinavichius was signed on 10 March, he was arrested on the 17th, being accused of keeping 3 kg of TNT at the apartment where he has not lived or stayed for several years. They also searched my apartment, trying to find some kind of cartridges. Such dirty methods show that the political forces headed by Pyatkyavichius, the present chairman of the Sejm of Lithuania for national

security, have understood that the delivery of oil, which the republic acutely needs, to the republic proves the total groundlessness of all the accusations against "Selma" and they have begun to act without thinking. Their goal is to destabilize the situation in the country and to come to power on this wave."

And here is the opinion of Audrius Butkyavichius, former minister for the conservation of the territory of Lithuania:

"Project 'Baltic Fleet—Selma' that we signed with Pavel Grachev was checked out three times by various government commissions. And despite the fact that governments changed, the attitude toward the project remained the same, because it was based on the striving to reach an agreement with all neighboring states through mutual compromise and to resolve our common problems jointly. Thanks to it, Russian troops were withdrawn from Lithuania ahead of schedule and as the first of all the former Soviet republics.

"But the provocation under discussion has another profoundly economic side. Today the project creates 2,000 jobs. Its development foresees the establishment of another 3,000 jobs. Under the conditions of the economic crisis and the increase in unemployment, this is a real contribution to the resolution of the problem. So that this provocation is very much like sabotage, which certain international forces are interested in," thinks Audrius Butkyavichius.

This is the situation. It is also obvious that willingly or unwillingly the procurator's office of Lithuania has begun to perform a role that is very much political rather than one of law enforcement.

Meanwhile, the information of the procurator's office to the effect that a lot of weapons were found at the apartment of Audrius Butkyavichius later turned out to mean a nominal sword that was given to the ex-minister for the conservation of the territory of Lithuania by the French foreign minister....

How did the President of Lithuania Algirdas Brazauskas react to this entire story? Speaking at a press conference on the occasion of the conclusion of a meeting of the presidents of the Baltic countries in Palanga, the president of Lithuania expressed his strong displeasure with this whole scandal. He criticized the mass media of Lithuania, which, in his opinion, are going too far and are taking over the functions of prosecution and court as well as the procurator's office, the actions of which involve a great deal of posturing with little content.

This is the sort of confused situation that occurred in a neighboring state. Of course it is up to the Lithuanians themselves to look into it. It is just a pity that for an undetermined time this "sorting out" is postponing the dream of servicemen of the Russian Army who are without housing.

Ukraine Tries to Detain Hydrographic Ship Cheleken

94UM0372C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 12 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Maryukha: "If an Agreement Cannot Be Reached Peaceably, It Must Be Taken by Storm": The Ukrainian Side Again Resorts to Methods of Force to Divide the Black Sea Fleet"]

[Text] Early Friday morning, 8 April, in the port of Odessa, a subunit of the Ukrainian special forces tried to block the hydrographic ship "Cheleken" of the Black Sea Fleet that was following the scheduled route Sevastopol-Odessa-Ismail-Sevastopol for technical servicing of hydrographic equipment in the zone of responsibility of the Black Sea Fleet. Initially, as a pretext to detain the ship, they accused the members of the Black Sea Fleet of trying to take out navigation equipment supposedly belonging to Ukraine. And when this failed, they accused them of transporting radioactive wastes. But it must be understood that Ukraine is not allocating any funds to provide navigation equipment for the Black Sea and hence it does not have this kind of property and the "Cheleken," just as other such ships, is incapable of transporting radioactive and other wastes.

The armed guard cooled the passion of the special forces. But the conflict was almost continued at sea, where four attack aircraft of the Ukrainian Air Force took to the air and Ukrainian border craft went out to intercept the "Cheleken." Accompanied by ships of the Black Sea Fleet, the "Cheleken" safely arrived in Sevastopol.

But the Ukrainian special forces undertook another action apparently as revenge for the failure of the provocation with the "Cheleken." At 2240 on 10 April, the city directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Odessa received a report on shooting in the region of the deployment of a division of reserve ships of the Black Sea Fleet. There special forces on board the ship "Slavutich" of the Ukrainian Navy command that came to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the liberation of the city "liberated" Odessa in their own way. About 120 submachinegunners seized a communications center, a base support unit, a secret unit, and weapons of a division of ships. They first assembled the personnel and the family members of people in the Black Sea Fleet on the parade grounds and then, according to the information available, they took them to the settlement of Chabanka 10 km from Odessa. The chief of staff of the division, Capt. 2nd Rank Aleksandr Zelenka, remained under arrest in the territory of the unit. It was thanks to his resolute action that the "Cheleken" was able to break through the blockade of the special forces. The division commander, Capt. 1st Rank Oleg Feoktistov, and the commander of the base support unit, Capt. 2nd Rank Dmitriy Starikov, were led away to the Ukrainian military headquarters in handcuffs.

The presence of Vice Adm. Vladimir Bezkorovaynyy, commander of the Ukrainian Naval Forces, in Odessa at

the time of the mentioned events can definitely be assessed as a renewal of attempts by Ukrainian officials to resolve the question of the status of the Black Sea Fleet through methods of force. But it seems that they have gone too far in their zeal and loyalty to the "nationalistic" idea: In accordance with the information of the press center of the Black Sea Fleet, there are wounded persons among the personnel of the division of reserve ships, the families of Russian seamen were subjected to derision and beating during this provocation, and there are also wounded among the children of service personnel. And if one considers that most of the commanders of Russian units of the Black Sea Fleet received anonymous letters with threats of physical punishment and inevitable sabotage, then it becomes clear that in the division of the Black Sea Fleet Ukraine is relying on methods of force, including acts of terrorism.

Another confirmation of this is the further development of the situation in Odessa. Still another Black Sea division—of hydrographic ships—was blockaded yesterday morning. Communication with the Russian subunit was interrupted. According to a report by a diplomatic correspondent of ITAR-TASS, the Ukrainian Embassy in Russia is "not yet ready to comment" on this and the preceding provocation against the members of the Black Sea Fleet.

In a statement, the command of the naval forces of the Russian Federation has resolutely protested the provocative actions of the Ukrainian side.

UKRAINE

Ukraine's Effort to Launch Space Program Explored

Significance in Military Affairs Noted

94UM0365A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
14 Jan 94 p 1

[Article by NA information service under the rubric "Ukraine and Space": "Will It Get Off the Ground?"]

[Text] Even though the military doctrine of Ukraine indicates that a special place in the building of the Ukrainian Army belongs to areas connected with the development of military space science, it is still defined more by the presence of the space infrastructure facilities that were left on the territory of Ukraine after the collapse of the USSR. This unique equipment was once used to make international space flights, but Russia has now excluded those facilities from the overall network that existed during the time of the USSR.

The main compromise that the Ukrainian military was able to reach over the past year was the agreement of the leaders of the space forces of the Russian Federation to grant their Ukrainian colleagues an opportunity, on an optional basis and from time to time, to exercise the control of civilian satellites. The Ukrainian military has

now performed as many as two thousand control sessions. This, however, is considerably less than the actual technical capabilities of Kiev. It has not been ruled out that the work controlling the satellites will be shifted from an optional to a permanent basis in the near future.

Kiev, among other things, is hoping to make use of some communications satellites at points in space that are, unlike Ukraine, not of particular interest to Russia in the interests of the Ukrainian military. The final decision, however, will be made only after the signing of an international treaty for military collaboration between Moscow and Kiev. The next round on this topic is planned to be held in February.

It should be added that the National Space Agency of Ukraine, together with the Missile and Space Weaponry Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, will take part this year in the "Mars-94" international scientific program. Sixteen countries, among them Ukraine, are involved in the fulfillment of that program. The world community thus considers Ukraine a space power, although specialists feel that we can count on launching our own satellite at the end of 1995 at best.

Tarasyuk at 25 January Meeting

94UM0365B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
27 Jan 94 p 1

[News item from Ministry of Armed Forces of Ukraine Press Center and Ukrinform: "Launch of Space Program"]

[Text] The most recent session of the National Committee of Ukraine on Issues of Disarmament was held under the chairmanship of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine B.I. Tarasyuk on January 25. Specific steps to provide the external conditions for the realization of the National Missile and Space Program were considered during the session, and a whole set of problems connected with the possible joining of Ukraine with the international missile technology control regime was discussed in that context.

Officer Interviewed on Military Space Program Prospects

94UM0365C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
12 Apr 94 p 1

[Interview with Colonel Yevhen Makhonin of the Missile and Space Weaponry Directorate by NARODNA ARMIYA commentator Serhiy Zhurets under the rubric "Today is World Air and Space Day": "Space in Khaki Color: Prospects and Reality"]

[Text] *The development of military space science is considered to be one of the main areas in building the modern Ukrainian Army. We sometimes devote more attention, however, to discussions of the prospects of the present day than the realities. We will thus try and answer the question of "What is the military space science of*

Ukraine living on?" on April 12—a day traditionally devoted to all who have an affiliation with space. Our correspondent met with an officer from the Missile and Space Weaponry Directorate, Colonel Yevhen Makhonin, and asked him to answer a series of questions.

[Zhurets] Yevhen Ivanovych, what tasks connected with strengthening the defensive capability of Ukraine can military space science handle today?

[Makhonin] Military space science can resolve a whole spectrum of defensive tasks. They are, first and foremost, the reconnaissance activity that all of the developed nations engage in; they are also the creation of orbital groups of communications satellites that support the command and control of troops.

The use of space to perform navigational tasks, cartography and meteorological support has great significance in supporting defensive capability. There are other tasks that exist that could be resolved through the use of space as well, but for Ukraine are relegated to the distant future. This pertains, for example, to the deployment of a system to warn of a missile attack.

It should be emphasized, however, that our views on the use of military space science are based first and foremost on the creation of a dual-purpose system. The space facilities and space infrastructure could be used both by the specialists of the Ministry of Defense, and by civilian specialists in the interests of the national economy. This direction in the development of space is considered to be the most advisable allowing for the financial capabilities of Ukraine.

[Zhurets] So what are the personnel of the military-space units that are subordinate to the Missile and Space Weaponry Directorate of the MO [Ministry of Defense] of Ukraine engaged in today?

[Makhonin] Planned combat training. The space facilities are being maintained in operable condition.

Tasks are also being performed in the supervision of the Granat station, and telemetric information from the Mir orbital complex is being relayed in coordination with the Russian Space Agency and the Energiya Scientific-Production Association.

We are now trying to resolve the question of having our facilities operating not in an optional mode, but rather to their full extent. Documents under the review of the general director of the Russian Space Agency, Yuriy Koptev, are necessary for that purpose. We should be receiving an answer shortly now. Either positive or negative.

[Zhurets] What are you expecting?

[Makhonin] We are hoping for the best, since a great deal of preparatory work has been done. The question, however, is unfortunately more political than technical. Its resolution will thus depend a great deal on relations between Ukraine and Russia.

[Zhurets] All of this pertains only to the civilian sphere, however. What about the military tasks? Are they being resolved by the military-space units of Ukraine today?

[Makhonin] Our military-space units are unfortunately not accomplishing purely military tasks today. This is explained by the fact that we do not have our own space orbital forces that would be operating in the interests of our armed forces. The use of Russian military satellites is being blocked by the stance of the command of the military-space forces of the MO of the Russian Federation.

[Zhurets] Blocked by technical means?

[Makhonin] Both technical and organizational. But our gear permits us to communicate with operating satellites. Such interference, however, would be considered a violation of international treaties.

[Zhurets] But do treaties really exist between Ukraine and Russia that would regulate relations in space?

[Makhonin] No, there are no such treaties, but we cannot intrude in an unsanctioned manner into the control of orbital objects of another state. Things have taken shape historically in such a way that all of the orbital space forces that existed during the time of the Soviet Union are now being used only in the interests of Russia, and are controlled by the military-space forces of the Russian Federation. This was not done in coordination with the other republics of the former USSR.

[Zhurets] So it turns out that some can speak from positions of strength, with a regard only for their own interests, and others not?

[Makhonin] We cannot take the path of violations, even though we are being shown an example of it. I nonetheless hope that we will someday be cooperating not only with the Russian Space Agency, but also with the military-space units of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. That cooperation, however, requires judicial and legal underpinnings first. There are none as yet. But I should point out that we have been preparing two draft agreements on cooperation in the military-space realm, intended for the chief of the General Staff of the Russian armed forces. Those documents will be sent in March.

[Zhurets] But when can we count on the launch of our own military satellite? Information has come out that Pivdenmash has already received such an order.

[Makhonin] Pivdenmash is not making a purely military satellite. But Pivdenmash really does have an order for the manufacture of a satellite that was issued by the National Space Agency of Ukraine [NKAU]. We are considering the creation of such a satellite and its subsequent use as a dual-purpose satellite, in the interests of the Ministry of Defense as well. As for the date, that will be sometime in 1996.

It is not a matter of a satellite alone, however. We are making considerable effort, together with NKAU, to see that this spacecraft is under the control of the national facilities of Ukraine. A Flight Control Center, a ballistic center, an automated ground control complex—that is, a considerable quantity of facilities in the ground infrastructure—are necessary for this.

Ukraine has only fragments of that infrastructure, and if the necessary facilities are not built in a very brief time, then the information coming from it after it is launched into orbit will be received by facilities that are located outside the borders of Ukraine, which is intolerable, especially if we are talking about official or military information. Our proposals on the necessity of creating a center for the receipt and processing of dedicated official information are being considered by the Cabinet of Ministers, and no decision has been made as yet.

[Zhurets] It is clear that the resolution of all of these problems of the present day and the activity for the future is connected first and foremost with funding. Last year the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine received just one percent of the necessary amount for the needs of military space science. Will the situation change after the approval of the state budget of Ukraine for 1994?

[Makhonin] The amount of funding that is allocated this year for the needs of the Ministry of Defense, frankly speaking, is a joke. There is none. And matters have not improved fundamentally with regard to the needs of military-space science...

[Zhurets] So then, nothing remains for us but to hope for the best. In conclusion, I would like to congratulate you personally and all the military employees of the military-space units of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine on Space Day, and wish you all the best.

Air Defense Force Command and Control Discussed

94UM0347A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
11 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent Captain Serhiy Seheda: "The Defenders of the 'Fifth Ocean'"]

[Text] *A traditional wish to one another among holiday greetings is a clear and calm sky. One rarely thinks about the fact that the sky is not such in and of itself. It has its reliable defenders—the Air Defense Forces [PPO] of Ukraine. This material is about the difficult and intense work of the command post of the PPO forces, about the people who are the true defenders and masters of the azure skies during their combat duty.*

Man has long been at home in the great ocean of the air. Close to two thousand aircraft that go up from military and civilian airfields are in the skies of Ukraine alone simultaneously. It has its own roadways and trails that are invisible to the uninitiated, passage along which has

its own laws and rules, the upholding of which is tracked by the PPO forces themselves. All—from the gray-haired general to the clean-shaven recruit—are profoundly acquainted with the importance of the task that has been entrusted to them. That is perhaps why the prestige of the PPO forces is maintained at the proper level. Even those who have long since been discharged into the reserves recall with a feeling of pride, "I served in the PPO."

The numerous posts of the radar stations sweep the airspace with sensitive gear, guarding the air boundaries of our state. All of the information comes to the command post of the PPO of Ukraine, and the airspace of the country is laid out there, as if in the palm of your hand, on large indicator panels and screens, and combat patrols are underway here constantly—both day and night. The command post is more or less the brains of the PPO forces, linked by thousands of nerves—communications lines—with the other posts. The receipt and processing of information and the making of decisions—intensive and complex work by the personnel at the CP stands behind these simple words.

The command post is a unique underground structure worth talking about and interesting to get to know. Every line of this material was considered secret not that long ago, and the censor would not have let it into print. There are military secrets today as well, but they pertain to what really is not subject to divulging. The command post went onto combat duty in 1982. This is a modern structure, three stories down, made from an integral unit. They say here that they do not fear even the heaviest of bombs. It is a large underground city with a labyrinth of passages and massive, airtight doors or hatches between sections and spacious halls. I needed close to an hour for just a cursory look around the CP. Going down the steps I felt it become warmer, with the breeze from the air conditioners a reminder that there was a layer of earth above us.

"The command post is always at constant combat readiness. The pledge of that is the coordinated actions of all the services of the CP," said Colonel H. Avramenko.

The support command performs an important part of the work with regard to maintaining the functional conditions of the command post. It is headed by Lieutenant-Colonel A. Andriyko. The maintenance of proper order requires extraordinary efforts during our times of overall scarcity. But as the people say, the bread may be damp but the powder is dry.

"It could not be otherwise," said Lieutenant-Colonel Andriyko. "However you look at it, the ground subunits are only large training centers, while we, the Air Defense Forces, are performing combat tasks every minute."

The same way as all roads lead to Rome, all the threads of information run to the center's automated command and control systems (ASU). Information on the status of the airspace of Ukraine comes right to here. After processing by computer, it is fed to the screen of the

individual and general-use equipment. All of the target descriptions are right at your fingertips. And woe to whoever becomes a target for the PVO forces.

The monitoring gear has been assembled in the documentation room. All of discussions, commands from the commanders and words of subordinates pertaining to the work on the targets in the course of combat training are recorded on a 20-track tape recorder. Listening later to the taped entries, or as the specialists say, the objective monitoring data, the servicemen have an opportunity to analyze the actions of the combat support in the course of training or to learn from their own mistakes, and find the culprit who let the target get by, if that happened.

"The ASU engineers are working on creating a local computer network using domestic gear, which will provide for the more reliable recreation and receipt of information," related Lieutenant-Colonel Volodymyr Bobkov. "The ASU specialists are planning to complete it at the end of 1994. This will provide an opportunity for each to have at hand the information that he needs. The local computer network will ease considerably the monitoring of the invisible air routes."

The PPO districts will have these computer systems in time as well. If these networks are linked into one, then it will be the most modern system in the armed forces of Ukraine with regard to the automation of data transmission. A similar system could be created, by the way, for the armed forces of Ukraine as a whole based on the experience of the PPO. One already exists, for example, in the West.

The ASU gear has been operating reliably since the entry into service of the command post, since 1982. Not one of its 2,500 devices has been recorded as out of service. Credit for that also goes to Lieutenant-Colonel Bobkov, an experienced specialist who has served in the PPO forces for 25 years. He knows this command post inside and out, since in 1982, it could be said, he brought life to the automatic command and control system. There is perhaps not a single part that Volodymyr Mykhaylovych does not know, not a wire that has not touched his hands. The commander and his subordinates—Lieutenant-Colonel E. Kreydych, Major M. Dronov, Captain Yu. Kudinov and Senior Lieutenant O. Hetman—are well matched, as they say.

Servicewomen were working in great concentration in the RITz hall, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Ye. Kolpakov, as seen through apertures in the partitions. Intelligence information from the PPO subunits of Ukraine comes in there.

A working quiet always reigns in the combat command and control hall. Devices are operating, and people from combat support move about quietly. Decisions are made in this room to destroy the violators of the airspace of Ukraine. But everything was still peaceful here. Screens

flickered, switches clicked... Even an ordinary television—and it was “serving” as well. All signals for the civilian population, after all, are transmitted by television and radio.

“I feel,” said Colonel A. Radzyvlyuk, “that after the collapse of the Union, the situation at the CP did not worsen. New gear, on the contrary, is always coming in, and computerization is underway. I feel that we are at full combat readiness, and the air borders of Ukraine are soundly monitored. We have an indicator panel of information, by the way, that recreates the weather conditions at any airport in Ukraine. There is no such device at any other CP in the CIS countries.”

An exercise was conducted recently at the CP to coordinate the actions of the combat services, which demonstrated the high degree of coordination in the work of all the services and the fine training of each officer and soldier.

Bizhan on Cadre Policy, Air Force-Air Defense Unification

94UM0347B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
6 Apr 94 p 1

[Responses to questions of correspondents from NA Information Service by Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine Colonel-General Ivan Bizhan: “The Main Criterion is Professionalism”]

[Text] *Some of the mass media have recently published rumors concerning cadre policies in the armed forces of Ukraine, as well as other questions of the building of the Ukrainian Army. Unfortunately, not everything was set forth the way it really is. Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine Colonel-General Ivan Bizhan thus met with a group of correspondents and answered a series of questions.*

Certification commissions have been created in the armed forces of Ukraine through the corresponding order of the Minister of Defense, said Ivan Vasylovych. A higher certification commission has been created in the central apparatus of the MO [Ministry of Defense], which I head as a deputy Minister of Defense. All appointments or movements starting at brigade commander and above will go through that commission. It is composed of eleven people. We will review in detail at sessions the candidacies of each officer or general, and devise recommendations for the making of a decision by the Minister of Defense. If a special situation arises pertaining to this or that candidacy, we will review it at a session of the Military Collegium of the Ministry of Defense. The decision to appoint is always made in collegial fashion, on democratic principles. And it would be incorrect to say that the Minister of Defense himself has assigned a person to some position or removed someone else. I want to say once again that all appointments are made only after serious substantiation.

Colonel-General Bizhan next cited several recent examples, including one concerning the chief of the Finance and Economic Directorate of the MO, Major-General Ivan Shtopenko. Last month, continued Ivan Vasylovych, we were considering his activity and the work of the whole directorate at the Military Collegium. All of the members of the Military Collegium expressed the opinion that this directorate was doing unsatisfactory work. A dissatisfactory evaluation was also given to the chief of the directorate himself. But some feel that all of this is repressive measures by the Minister of Defense, who wants to get rid of General Shtopenko. How do matters really stand? There was a collapse in the work, the reasons for which we reviewed at a session of the Military Collegium, and the necessity even arose of appealing to the military procuracy, which had to do some work in that directorate. The Minister of Defense thus decided to analyze the situation in detail once more, and prepare the appropriate proposals.

Since the first days of the Ukrainian Army, emphasized Ivan Vasylovych, the professional level of the person was reviewed first and foremost when appointing them to a certain position. The second principle was and remains citizenship. We do not consider whether he is a Ukrainian, a Russian, or a representative of some other ethnic group. The main thing is that he be a citizen of Ukraine. We also take into consideration the honesty, the decency of the person recommended for a position, his loyalty to the idea of building an independent Ukraine and its armed forces. No other criteria have existed or do exist for us. We have no principle of the “telephone call” and all that. Colonel-General I. Bizhan, in the course of his discussion with the journalists, touched on the results of the recent exercises in the Air Forces [VPS] of Ukraine. He reminded us that Lieutenant-General Volodymyr Antonets was appointed to the position of commander of the VPS. Ivan Vasylovych also reminded us of the fact that the military council of the VPS, headed at the time by then commander Lieutenant-General Valeriy Vasylyev, was ready to retire *en masse* if General Antonets was appointed to the position of commander. There were a great many rumors surrounding this, including in the mass media. Matters turned out otherwise in reality. The last exercise showed that the VPS command, headed by Lieutenant-General Vasylyev, was not engaged in combat training and other questions at an appropriate level. And now a great deal of effort must be expended for the VPS directorate to be able to reach that level.

When we were talking with the members of the military council of the VPS who had signed the report concerning discharge in the event of the appointment of General Antonets, they repudiated it. That is first. Second, we ascertained that the situation that had existed earlier had been satisfactory to the former command, and they thus did not want any changes in it. I want to be certain that with the coming of the new commander—Lieutenant-General Antonets—the situation will be altered. We understand that there is a very difficult

situation in the VPS right now, fuel is lacking. But there has to be responsibility of the officials and rhythm in the work first of all.

Ivan Vasylovych touched on the question of the unification of the PPO [air-defense forces] and the VPS in his conversation with the journalists. He emphasized that the decision on unification of these two branches of the armed forces into a unified one was made in a principled fashion. Time is required, however, to put this promising idea into practice. It is a gradual process. Quite a few issues will still arise, and we will have to be ready to resolve them. The corresponding directorate has been created today, and it will study a whole range of problems and prepare the appropriate proposals over this year. When all of this is substantiated, we will make the final decision. But it is not a decision pertaining to the unification, emphasized Ivan Vasylovych; everything here has been determined in principled fashion, as I have said already. I have in mind a decision on when to create all of this. This year or next, and so on.

Answering a question pertaining to strategic aviation, Colonel-General Ivan Bizhan emphasized that it belongs entirely to Ukraine and its armed forces. We have modern aircraft. They are being manufactured in Russia, and it is very difficult for us to obtain them, to service them, to maintain the fighting ability of both the aircraft and the flight personnel. The problem of the existence of strategic aviation is being resolved at the state level today.

Answering a question pertaining to the fate of the members of the military council of the VPS who signed the well-known statement, Colonel-General Ivan Bizhan emphasized once again that they had all repudiated that decision. There will be no persecution. But some will doubtless be leaving by their own desire. We will resolve the question, and the Minister of Defense demands that of us, so as to create all of the conditions necessary for the fruitful work of the new commander and assemble a highly skilled apparatus for him that would want to build that branch of the armed forces.

Colonel-General Bizhan, at the request of a correspondent from NARODNA ARMIYA, announced the composition of the higher certification commission of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. It includes, in particular, Colonel-General Anatoliy Lopata, Colonel-General Ivan Oliynyk, Colonel-General Hryhoriy Mikhaylichenko, Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Kozbar and Major-General Yosyp Osiychuk. All prestigious and well-known people in the armed forces of Ukraine.

Colonel-General Ivan Bizhan has headed the higher certification commission since its first days. He cited many examples of its fruitful work in the course of the discussion with the journalists, and expressed the conviction that it will be able to meet the duties entrusted to it in the future as well.

Colonel-General Ivan Bizhan also answered other questions from the journalists during the course of the meeting.

Ukrainian Generals Visit Crimea During Meshkov's Absence

94UM0379A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Maryukha, under the rubric: "From Crimea": "The 'Assault Force' of Ukrainian Generals"]

[Text] A large group of Ukrainian military leaders have been sent to the peninsula in the absence of the Crimean President (Yuriy Meshkov is in Cyprus on business) and without the approval of the leadership of the Crimean Republic or the Black Sea Fleet command authorities.

President Kravchuk appointed Major-General Vladimir Pipenko as the officer in charge of the general's "assault force" and Ukrainian Minister of Defense General of the Army Radetsky, Armed Forces Intelligence Directorate Chief Major-General Vegunnikov, Air Force Commander Major-General Antonets, National Guard Chief of Staff Major-General Mokhov, and Counterintelligence Directorate Chief Major-General Kravchenko are arriving in the Crimea by train and by air. It's unclear what caused this.

Details of 14th Air Army Combat Training

94UM0363 Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
9 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA special correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel Nykyfor Lysytsya: "Only the 'Old-Timers' Go Into 'Battle,' But All Learn"]

[Text] The pages of our newspaper have already mentioned more than once the difficulties in the training of pilots—and all aviation specialists—owing to the scarcity of fuel. But the fliers are trying to maintain their combat skills even under these difficult conditions, taking advantage of the slightest opportunities for that purpose. That includes the tactical training of a motorized-rifle regiment at the Lviv proving ground for the 14th Air Army, which resolved to make use of it with the greatest efficiency. Flight-training work was launched in most of the air units during the preparatory period to perform specific tasks pertaining to providing air support for the combat operations of the motorized-rifle regiment and the subunits that were supporting it.

The assault aircraft, headed by regimental commander Colonel Renat Sadikov, practiced the mission of making strikes against enemy defenses in the breakthrough sector and for the entry of the second echelon into battle. Flights were made recently with weapons delivery on the practice range by pilots 1st class Lieutenant-Colonels Orest Vityovych and Mykola Dykyy, Major Oleksandr Kozyrev and Captain Viktor Molchanov, as well as

specialists 2nd class Captains Oleksandr Zayikin, Ihor Shklo and Oleksandr Vysotskyy. They all had quite good results.

The bombers had their own assignments. They practiced bombing runs during extreme flight shifts against the enemy during the movement of the motorized riflemen to the attack and their defensive operations. Regimental commander Colonel Oleksiy Kotov and Majors Mykola Lavruk, Arkadiy Vashtin and Mykola Kostyuchenkov were all able to raise their level of mastery therein. They are all pilots 1st class. The same assignment was also practiced by the pilots in another bomber regiment. Lieutenant-Colonel Mykola Slonchynskyy and Majors Rasya Vasylyuk, Serhiy Mykulsky and Yuriy Bakun were fortunate enough to be able to make flights with weapons delivery. And it should also be pointed out that they handled that assignment successfully.

The reconnaissance pilots also took advantage of the opportunity. They carried out their own specific missions. Reconnaissance flights were made by Lieutenant-Colonels Hryhoriy Khoreshko, Oleksandr Kabachenko and Oleh Shenyayev along with Major Hennadiy Stomylo. The first two have the highest skills classification of pilot-expert marksman. And they confirmed it during the flights, fulfilling the assignment with the precision of expert marksmen.

It is well known that assigning accurate fighter/bomber strikes against an enemy is an almost impossible task without the winning of air supremacy over the battlefield. Representatives of fighter aviation thus practiced the missions of sweeping the sky of enemy fighters and destroying his bombers that were trying to strike at the motorized riflemen. Lieutenant-Colonel Oleksandr Kukhar and Majors Mykola Romanov, Volodymyr Vecherynsky and Anatoliy Kozlov were among those who practiced those missions. They are all pilots 1st class, and have a great deal of experience in combat air patrols protecting the air borders of our nations.

It can be seen very well from the data cited above that the flights were made mostly by pilots with the highest skills classifications. And that was no accident, first and foremost because they are among the leading combat crews in their units and should have the most practical training. It is also easier with pilots 1st class to maintain their skills with lower material expenditures (quite important under our conditions) than the pilots 2nd or 3rd class. They can act in the role of instructors and bring up to speed those who have partly lost their skills, with large intervals between flights.

It is also important to point out the fact that before a flight for weapons delivery, and that is effectively the most complex of missions, the pilot should make a whole series of flights for flying technique, as well as under normal and difficult weather conditions. And the higher the skill level of the aerial warrior, the fewer times he has to take the aircraft up to make the training flights. The advantage thus goes to the "old-timers," as they say.

Army aviation—the units equipped with rotary-winged craft—is also not sitting on the airfields these days either. It is closer to the Ground Defense Troops in its dedicated purpose, and has to provide direct support for them. The combat assignment in the helicopter units and subunits thus proceeded in such a way as to rehearse missions that could arise during support for the combat operations of the motorized-rifle regiment. The subordinates of Lieutenant-Colonel Borys Horoshko, for instance, recently rehearsed the landing of a tactical air assault.

Pilots Lieutenant-Colonel Anatoliy Bratash, Majors Borys Yaromych and Leonid Mulyk, and Captains Mykhailo Budyak and Anatoliy Kohut, along with their crews, practiced making targeted missile and cannon fire from helicopter weapons against small targets in the helicopter unit armed with rotary-winged craft for fire support. The subordinates of Lieutenant-Colonel Volodymyr Honcharov also carried out similar missions during the flights. They demonstrated unusual mastery in their Mi-24 craft.

The fliers of almost the entire air army thus conducted intensive training and exercises in interacting with the ground troops. This could evoke doubts among some— isn't that too much air power for one regimental tactical exercise?

It is worth pointing out first of all that planned combat training, with the most varied types of flights in terms of missions and complexity, is being carried out in all the support flight units and subunits. Their effectiveness, as experience testifies, is higher when it is done not against some abstract tactical background, but rather in response to concrete, actual operations by the ground troops. It is one thing when a pilot only pictures in his mind the actions of the motorized riflemen or tanks in the interests of which he is making the combat or missile strikes. It is quite another when he actually sees the tactical situation below him. This is also better received psychologically, with a greater feeling of responsibility for his actions. And, of course, more selfless. So why not take advantage of such an opportunity?

Moreover, each of the flight regiments, and even squadrons, has its own dedicated purpose that is characteristic of it alone. The bombers and fighters were not used by themselves. It was almost as if they were in an actual combat situation in the exercise.

It would of course have been possible to activate the pilots from just one bomber regiment, rather than two. But the commanders of the 14th Air Army did this on purpose. In our times, when the opportunities for the holding of exercises are very limited, it is better to have one or two crews in each regiment who have made flights with weapons delivery than one entire flight or squadron. Those pilots can later pass on their experience to their young colleagues. The main thing is that when at least one crew flies, it is not only those who are in the cockpit of the fighter or bomber at the time who learn; all

of the pilots in the regiment or squadron gain experience. They follow the actions of their colleagues, analyze them, adopt something or other. To that should be added that all of the ground specialists who support the flights also learn. They are the flight operations officers, weather forecasters, communications personnel, engineers, representatives of the airfield technical services etc.

The fact that each regiment and squadron completed a whole set of theoretical and practical exercises before the flights was also of no small significance. They were not conducted in a formalized manner, but rather with absolute dedication. The pilots were not sitting in the trainers because they had nothing to do, but rather to train themselves to go up into the sky.

The tight time frames for preparing for the exercises also played a positive role, to a certain extent, for the fliers. The unit commanders were forced to conduct their flights shifts in more intensive fashion. The weather forced some adjustments as well. They had to make use of even the smallest breaks among the streams of clouds the day before. And that called for greater skill and self-mobilization from each pilot who took an aircraft up into the sky.

Nuclear Control Deputy Head on Disarmament Progress

94UM0366A Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA* in Ukrainian
13 Apr 94 p 3

[Article by Colonel Volodymyr Tertychnyy, deputy chief of the Center for Administrative Control of the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, under the rubric "Point of View": "Ukraine Is Moving Towards Nonnuclear Status, But She Should Not Be Prodded in the Back as She Does So"]

[Text] As soon as Ukraine announced her intention to assume a nonnuclear status, it became necessary to decide how she would proceed to reach this goal. What and how much should be reduced and when should this be done; what should be destroyed and what could be converted for use in the national economy. How much all of this would cost, and where the money for liquidating the nuclear missiles [raketno-yaderna zbroya] would come from. After all, it was clear to everyone that nuclear disarmament would place a heavy burden on Ukraine's weak economy.

The first to offer assistance were the United States. Under the Nunn-Lugar bill, Ukraine was to receive 175 million dollars in aid on condition that she ratified the START-I [SNO-I] Treaty. This was at the end of 1992. At that time, this question was discussed for the first time in the Supreme Council. There were several meetings of joint commissions, in which specialists from the Academy of Sciences, the military-industrial complex, and the ministries of defense, environmental protection, and foreign affairs were invited to participate. It was becoming clear that Ukraine would reduce her nuclear

arsenal in stages and would take steps to liquidate her nuclear weapons. But all of this requires large amounts of money

At that time, Ukraine's parliament was more inclined to retain the nuclear weapons in Ukraine until Ukraine had received reliable guarantees of her national statehood from the states belonging to the nuclear club. This being the case, it was assumed that no funds would be received from the United States without the ratification of the START-I Treaty. Almost a year was spent on settling this issue. During that time, several international symposia and seminars were held in Ukraine, at which various aspects associated with nuclear disarmament were discussed. Ukraine was visited by representatives from various countries: Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and others. The presence of nuclear weapons in Ukraine was of concern to politicians, diplomats, military men, and the representatives of various public organizations. No sooner did one delegation leave, than another arrived. And all wanted to know as much as possible about the nuclear weapons in Ukraine: where they were deployed, how many of them were there, the number of military personnel servicing them, etc. An extensive, purposeful campaign was waged to collect the necessary information. It was clear who needed it and for what purpose. The representatives of the Russian Federation's press contributed their share to this process. During this period, the newspaper *Izvestiya* repeatedly published articles by its special correspondent, L. Litovkin, who had access to circles close to the Strategic Missile Forces [RVSP—raketni viyska stratehichnoho pryznachennya—the Ukrainian equivalent of raketnye voyska strategicheskogo naznacheniya], in which he spread rumors about the dangerous state of the nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine.

Despite these obstacles, work on preparing the documents that would assure assistance from the United States continued, and on 25 October 1993, Ukraine and the United States signed a so-called "framework" treaty ["ramkova" uhoda], which provided for aid to Ukraine in liquidating nuclear missiles and discussed the obligations assumed by both sides. At the same time, experts began work on five implementational agreements in specific areas of assistance, which, too, were signed by the end of the year at the level of the relevant ministries. Naturally, this process was given momentum by the ratification of the START-I Treaty by the Supreme Council.

Inasmuch as the nuclear problem is very much at the center of attention, as they say, and it is possible to earn political capital on this issue, Ukraine began to receive offers of assistance from other countries as well, including countries that possess no nuclear weapons of their own and hence none of the technological means needed for destroying such weapons. Offers of help came from the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and Italy. Great Britain even proposed destroying the components

of nuclear fuel (which are very toxic) from Ukraine's missiles on its own territory and without any cost to Ukraine.

Naturally, Ukraine's experts studied all these proposals very carefully, keeping in mind the scope of assistance being offered. For our part, we submitted to the different countries lists of the equipment we needed based on each country's expertise in the relevant fields.

Thus, the United States was given a list of equipment needed to destroy silo-launched missiles [raket, shakhtnykh puskovykh ustanovok], while a different list was submitted to Germany. This second list included equipment needed for ecologically safe destruction of the wastes produced during the process of neutralizing missiles, equipment for ecological research, and for the work that needs to be done in the event of an accident. Japan offered assistance in the form of medical equipment for monitoring the people working with nuclear missiles, while Italy proposed equipment for creating jobs for military personnel discharged in the process of reducing the nuclear arsenal.

This targeted distribution allows for a more practical apportionment of the small amounts of money that these countries are contributing.

Ukraine receives this assistance not in the form of money, but in the form of equipment. Quite understandably, this is preferable to the countries that are providing this assistance, because it assures jobs for their own citizens, protects the infrastructure of their enterprises, and earns them political dividends.

One of the issues that Ukraine's representatives stressed throughout the course of the negotiations on nuclear disarmament was the social protection of military personnel that will be discharged in the process of reducing the missile formations [raketni z'yednannya]. The social security program will cost nearly two-thirds of the total sum. It anticipates the conversion of military facilities into industrial enterprises, training of personnel, and, what is of greatest importance and urgency for Ukraine's members of the military, the construction of housing. Housing is to be built directly at the sites where the missile formations are stationed. The relevant ministries have been involved in solving these problems. Work will begin in this sphere in the very near future. The first installments of aid from the United States have already begun to arrive. One of the missile formations has already received fuel, motor vehicles, and equipment. Naturally, there are some hitches along the way. The formalities are taking up a great deal of time, and we as the customers are concerned by the high cost of some of the equipment. For example, the price of a motor vehicle used to escort the column is \$34,000, which is too high for a vehicle in this class.

Another concern is that the United States is continually and persistently prodding Ukraine to disarm in the shortest possible time. The START-I Treaty provides for both the volumes and timetable of these reductions.

It does not make much sense to alter these. If Ukraine does more than the treaty calls for, it does so of her own accord and not under pressure.

Clearly, the reduction of nuclear arms by Ukraine should be conducted in stages, in a comprehensive manner, taking into account economic and political consequences, and with the assistance of all countries who are interested in a real way in carrying out as complex a process as nuclear disarmament. Ukraine is fully entitled to such assistance.

BELARUS

Kazlowski Issues Order on Contract Service for Cadets

WS2904164894 Minsk BELAPAN in *Belarusian*
1430 GMT 29 Apr 94

[Text] BELAPAN has learned from the Belarusian Defense Ministry that Belarusian Defense Minister Colonel General Pavel Kazlowski signed an order "On Signing Military Service Contracts With Senior Cadets of Highest Military Education Institutions of the Belarusian Defense Ministry." According to the document, the final results of signing contracts with cadets from the Minsk Highest Command School (MVVKV) and the Minsk Highest Military Engineer School (MVIV) are to be summed up by 7 May. As of now, only two MVIV graduates and one four-grade cadet have signed the contracts. At the MVVKV, only the First Cadet Platoon has so far started to sign them. Colonel Mikalay Karlin, deputy chief of the Personnel Administration at the Belarusian Defense Ministry, told BELAPAN that the process of signing documents on mutual obligations between servicemen and the state came after a lengthy period of examining legal acts concerning the service of the Belarusian Army officers. Upon completion of a military school, cadets commit themselves for at least a five-year military service at the officer positions. After that, they either extend their contracts or are discharged from the Army. Cadets that signed no contract at the initial stage are also subject to discharge from the Belarusian Armed Forces. In the words of M. Karlin, the enactment of the defense minister's order does not mean that the Defense Ministry finished its work in this sphere. A statute is in the works now intended to determine responsibilities of both sides when signing a contract. In the future, it will be examined by interested ministries and submitted for approval to the Belarusian Supreme Soviet session.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Official on Conscription Irregularities

944K1108B Yerevan AZATAMART in *Russian* No 15,
19-25 Apr 94 p 4

[Interview with Gevorok Bagdasaryan, chairman of the Permanent Commission on Questions of Defense and

Internal Affairs of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Armenia, by Manvel Mkrtchyan; place and date not given: "If the Prestige of the Military Were High...."]

[Text] As we have learned, Mr. Bagdasaryan recently returned from the United States where some physicians who are our compatriots conducted a complicated heart operation on him. The operation was successful and now his condition is quite satisfactory.

[Mkrtchyan] Let us get one thing clear first: Was this form of recruitment agreed upon by the Ministry of Defense and your commission? Are you not afraid that recruitment using mass raids will compromise the very idea and increase the alarm in the society while simultaneously creating occasion for various legal infractions?

[Bagdasaryan] On 27 March of this year the government of the Republic of Armenia made a decision approving the list of officials not subject to being drafted for three-month active duty training. Everyone else, actually, by a decision of the government and the Ministry of Defense, is subject to the draft. But there is one "but" here.... The government is not coordinating all issues with the Supreme Council, particularly with our commission or the Commission on Legal Questions. And this is the reason mistakes have been made. I cannot say right now whether there are instructions granting military commissariats and the military police the right to arrange raids and other such actions. So far we have received no written protests from citizens to study them and set them in motion. We, like many others, learned about this from conversations with friends and acquaintances. According to these conversations there have been trading sessions on the spot, and in dollars or Russian rubles. Incidentally, there was a discussion of the aforementioned negative phenomena in the Presidium of the Supreme Council as well, but, I repeat, so far we have received no written complaints about the commission's orders.

By one of the resolutions adopted last year the Supreme Council made significant changes in the Law on Military Duty. They stipulate that if an individual with a military obligation does not show up at the military commissariat within three days after receipt of his notice, he may be held criminally liable. In other words, there is no need for additional notices or warnings. But, as we can see, the organizers of the raids have decided to take the shortest path. They decided not to wait until the draftees start evading the draft before they resorted to repressive measures in keeping with the law, but wanted to solve the problem at once, with the help of raids. I think that such forms of mobilization are unacceptable.

[Mkrtchyan] Mr. Bagdasaryan, let us take a look at the problem from the other side. As we know, the state minister for questions of defense, when summing up the results of the preceding recruitment, noted with satisfaction that when conducting it they managed to achieve extremely high indicators. The legitimate question arises: If it is possible to achieve such results using the

structure of military commissariats, what brought about the use of such "unacceptable," as you put it, methods during the last conscription?

[Bagdasaryan] I find it difficult to answer this question and I can only give my personal opinion. We have lived through a difficult winter and some of our citizens are outside the republic. This probably explains why the Ministry of Defense resorted to extreme measures to provide for mobilization of the necessary number of reservists.

[Mkrtchyan] The present military-political situation shows that our state will be forced to conduct large-scale mobilizations in the future as well. What is the legal basis for conducting them and how good is it?

[Bagdasaryan] The law on military duty regulates all of these questions. It has a special chapter devoted to the reserve and it talks about both the time periods and rights of the draftee and about the social protection for his family and everything else. So far we have received no proposals to make an amendment to the law and so far we see no need to make it either stricter or more lenient. I repeat that we too are dissatisfied with the form in which it is conducted...so far that is all.

[Mkrtchyan] We assume that the reasons for the panic that arose during the time of the mobilization and the evasion of the service go much deeper than people sometimes try to indicate. In this case the most important task is to provide for a favorable social and political atmosphere, level of psychological preparation, etc. Frequently one gets the impression that state propaganda, especially on television, does not see this as its task. And one wonders whether this is intentional or the result of inability. How do you assess the activity of state propaganda?

[Bagdasaryan] The gap that formed after the fall of communist ideology is now being filled with whatever is at hand. There is no clear-cut state ideology that could fill the vacuum. Possibly this is the reason why many of our citizens, including in administrative positions, are lacking ideological approaches. In my opinion, this explains the panic that arose. If this gap were filled, say, with the national ideology of Gagerin Nzhde, I do not think that we would be seeing such phenomena. If the people had an awareness that every Armenian family must have one military serviceman, such a panic would not have existed. If the prestige of the military had been high, there would not have been this kind of panic at all. But to tell the truth, I find it difficult to accuse anybody of the situation that developed. It seems to me that we are all to blame. And I watch almost no television because of a lack of electricity.

Army Volunteer Problems Detailed

944K1108A Yerevan AZATAMART in Russian No 15,
19-25 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by Arevik Arutyunyan: "Not Only Moral Victories"]

[Text] The garrison, which is located in one of the central regions of the capital, consists of volunteer units, people

serving in the army on a voluntary basis. The volunteers are considered to be the best fighting men in the army. They are distinguished by their good organization and ability. They are capable of performing any combat mission with small forces, using a small amount of military equipment, and with minimal losses. No matter what you say, experience accumulated over the years plays its role. The majority of these boys, who responded to the first call to protect the Armenian borders and to go to Artsakh—are bonded to one another by strong friendship and have been tempered by the harsh experiences of war. They are the eagles of the Gayduk detachments who, recognizing the need for a regular army, at the end of 1992 entered into contractual service. There is no doubt that sometimes in the "detachment," group sentiments show through, but they do not seem to impede service in the army any more.

For many of the old volunteers the main thing is responsibility and self-sacrifice, and their families have already become accustomed to this. The same task of protecting the Armenian land from enemy encroachment during the last year and a half has brought dozens of men of various ages to the army to serve in it on a voluntary basis. But among those who have signed up as volunteers, obviously, the largest number are people who have been forced to take this step because of their difficult socioeconomic position, and they hoped to use their pay to feed their families.

The military unit leaves an infinitely sad impression. The barracks, built during the forties, are unattractive. The soldiers' uniforms are worn out and have holes in places. Soon they will replace people who are in combat positions, although it is apparent that they have not had a chance to rest properly. Wounded men who have not fully recovered and even certain Azatamart members who have been given certificates of disability will be sent there. Such is the life of the volunteers, which for many of them has gone on for six years now. By the admission of the commanders, certain of them are not fit for combat duty.

Understandably, a contract army is something new for us. But slowness and obvious incompetence in solving the most important problems here are simply unforgivable.

The contract system leaves the impression that it is a package of documents that has absolutely not been worked through. The volunteer signs a contract without having an opportunity to finally clarify his rights, responsibilities, and privileges. The commander is also left in confusion because his "rites" of command are not clear. Social problems—the miserly pay, uniforms, treatment, medications, apartments, family, and a multitude of other concerns—are constantly producing anxiety and disturbing the soldier. A sense of being unprotected follows him into combat positions as well, where he cannot feel at ease about his family, who are far away and have been cast to the will of fate. True, there is a certain edict from the president of the republic concerning privileges and benefits for families of deceased and wounded Azatamart members, soldiers who have

participated in combat activities, which the president mentioned again literally a couple of days ago. But this involves such insignificant privileges and benefits that all this gives the impression of being nothing but a nice gesture.

And at the same time, problems are quite obvious in a contract army. If the objective is indeed to create a professional, well-trained army, then conditions generating an interest in the service become especially important here. Patriotic zeal can keep a soldier going only during the initial period of his service, and in unfavorable social conditions with time it gradually burns out, which is being felt even among the volunteers who are devoted to military service. Is it not surprising that even under conditions of ubiquitous unemployment and a helpless socioeconomic situation, people very rarely volunteer for military service?

There is no doubt that opportunities in Armenia are not great today, but one cannot say that there are absolutely no factors that provide incentive for service in the army. The volunteer who risks his life is offered an insignificant price in the material sense. But the soldier has a family and children, and to take care of them is also his permanent and sacred duty.

In Armenia today it is possible to buy an apartment, according to a modest calculation, for one day's revenue from a small store. Moreover, there are many apartments that actually belong to no one. At the same time many military servicemen who are protecting the homeland are living in dormitories and basements, under unfavorable conditions. At least this part of the army should be provided with apartments, and in general the provision of an apartment should be the best incentive for contract military service in Armenia. During the course of their service soldiers lose years when they could have been living in a different way. After service in the army it is exceptionally difficult to become accustomed to civilian life and to acquire a new specialty. And ultimately it is no secret that service in the army, especially in a war situation, to put it mildly, does not contribute to the development of intellectual capabilities. Sooner or later our military servicemen return home, but what will they do there?

This problem exists even today. Many volunteers are continuing their service simply because they do not see how they could make a living in this life, especially under conditions of a market economy, which are completely unknown and incomprehensible to them. In addition to material difficulties, in the future military servicemen will also experience psychological embarrassment and frustration. And a once strong, vital man gradually develops the feeling of inadequacy. There will be a new stratum in the society—superfluous people who have served and fought for anything but this.

High wages, an apartment, education—these are obviously important factors which could bring about competition among those who want to enter the army and thus stimulate the process of creating it.

In addition to the material incentive, there is also another important condition—state propaganda. Let us pay attention to the “respect” the soldier enjoys in Armenian reality. As distinct from the Soviet soldier, whom the people accepted into their homes as a native son, giving him warm hospitality everywhere, the Armenian soldier today meets with reproof and censure even when taking advantage of his right to free travel on city transportation. Moreover, the soldier's uniform has become somehow offensive to the eyes of those around him. Soldiers who are protecting their native land, cruel as it may be, are considered frivolous, rolling stones, somehow idle and limited people.

Herein lies one of the main reasons why people try to avoid service in the army, and this will continue as long as state propaganda is so far removed from the national ideology.

The temporary shelter for draftees into the army and reservists who have been called up for three months constitutes the same unknown quantity. They spend a month here, after which they are sent to a military training base. Without mentioning the failures of the first draft, one must say that this time there has been progress in the matter of organizing the daily life of the soldiers. The new uniforms are issued right away. Those people who are mobilized are fed three times a day and given the necessary nutritional norm. The bedding is clean and the bathing problem has been solved. There is always electricity in the military unit and the television sets work. Theoretical training lasts for one or two hours but practical training is inadequate because of the shortage of equipment. After noon those who wish to may leave the unit—under the condition that they return at a certain hour. Many prefer to stay in the unit where they can keep from getting bored.

So in the modern situation in Armenia the conditions created for military recruitment can without exaggeration be called favorable. The purpose of the active duty training is to familiarize men from 25 to 45 years of age with at least the fundamentals of military life and teach them to protect their native home. Obviously, this is a sacred task, but how have we prepared the most important thing for carrying it out—the training base? The military unit does not even have enough models of the most common weapons for instruction. There is only one firing range for target practice, and it is used by draftees from all seven regions of the capital. Firing practice is put off under the most diverse pretexts—on the first day the base is occupied, on the second day—the ordered transportation did not arrive, the next day—there are no cartridges. Cases like this exacerbate uncomplimentary ideas about the army, from the very first day of service weakening the vigilance and the composure of those who have been called into the army. We do not know what awaits people who have been mobilized into the army after a month, at the military training base. But if this kind of situation prevails here, the effectiveness of recruitment is greatly threatened.

We are not talking about questions of forms and methods of mobilization that flout human rights. Nor are we talking about the political objectives that are realized and the means that are applied, but as for elementary military training of the Armenian man—a most important and necessary matter of state importance—here we cannot close our eyes to the frivolous, antistate attitude toward this matter.

A former volunteer, speaking of the sad and difficult realities of the army, which, if they seem harmless and less than dangerous in the rear, become a cause of losses on the battlefield, noted sadly: “It is necessary to do something so that today's heroic battles are not regarded by future generations as mere moral victories.”

ARMS TRADE

Arms Enterprise Director on Ukraine's Arms Trade

94UM0364 Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
9 Apr 94 p 3

[Interview with Oleksandr Mykhaylovych Sharapov by NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent Senior Lieutenant Serhiy Zhurets: "Even a Mace Needs a Head—Especially When You Want To Sell It at a Profit"]

[Text] *When the arms trade is being discussed, the moral and ethical aspects of this issue are considered, as a rule, while sometimes forgetting a cruel economic truth: If they do not buy from us, they would buy from someone else. There is demand in the world market, after all, and that demand will be satisfied all the same. All sorts of commercial structures and intermediaries have long been aware of this dependency: Weapons are a commodity, moreover one that brings enormous profits. The pity is that the nations get only crumbs from those profits...*

Will the situation change in the future? The Ukroboronservis state enterprise was recently created, under the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and in accordance with the request of the President of Ukraine, for the export and import of products and services for military purposes.

Our correspondent met with the general director of the Ukroboronservis state enterprise, Oleksandr Sharapov, and asked him to answer a series of questions.

[Zhurets] Oleksandr Mykhaylovych, the first question suggests itself: Why has it become necessary to create a structure such as yours? And how did the process of the arms trade or services for military purposes take place before?

[Sharapov] The situation took shape in such a way that quite a large number of defense enterprises were left in Ukraine whose products were oriented toward exports after the fall of the Soviet Union. But all of the organizations and structures connected with the organization of military-technical collaboration were left in Russia. Ukraine, with its enterprises and its potential, was left twisting in the wind. And here is where a very interesting thing began to happen. The Russian structures occupied with questions of military-technical collaboration and the supply of weapons and hardware, under conditions of commercial mutual relations, organized their own commercial offices on the territory of Ukraine and abroad. All of the commercial offices were rushing to our state enterprises. And as it turned out, on the other hand, the Law on Enterprise and Entrepreneurial Activity allowed our plants some foreign-economic activity.

[Zhurets] So the commercial structures, including the Russian ones, began acting in the role of intermediary between Ukrainian enterprises and the customers in another country?

[Sharapov] That is indeed what happened. A natural and logical question thus arises: How much are the interests of the state being taken into account therein? Each plant director saw as his aim, first and foremost, that the expenditure portion of his products be recovered at that level of profitability that was established by the state in the course of those operations. Their interests did not go any further. And that is natural. The main thing is to see that the plant not fall apart, to provide oneself with orders and have pay for the workers. But when they realized that they cannot operate that way in the future, that the interests of the state in such a traditionally profitable sphere as the arms trade are not being taken into account to the full extent by any means. Thus, the need arose for an organization that would define the ideology and strategy of this military-technical collaboration and would act as the representative of the state in this sphere, occupied with resolving a whole set of such issues. A state ideology for price creation, an ideology for paying for these services, guarantees etc. are required to carry out that activity. No single enterprise has the strength to do that. The enterprise should fill the state order, and receive its money for the order at domestic prices. A state organization, taking world prices into account, has to resolve the rest of the questions: Taking into account the recovery of the expense mechanism; not concealing but taking into account commission expenditures for the state enterprise itself; and, taking into account some interdepartmental interests as well, in particular the body from which the military products have been taken for sale. That is the Ministry of Defense in this case. The President of Ukraine then made the decision to create a state structure, a state enterprise for the export and import of products for military purposes. That enterprise—Ukroboronservis—has now been created. And it was created under the aegis of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations [MZEZ].

[Zhurets] Why under the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations?

[Sharapov] That made it possible to encompass all spheres of the activity of the state in the foreign market. Our MZEZ has administrations that define the mutual relations with each state, and particularly the foreign-policy strategy of Ukraine in the world market as a whole. That is especially important in access to a world market with such a specific commodity as weapons, military hardware and the like.

[Zhurets] Who monitors the export of services for military purposes?

[Sharapov] That monitoring is performed today by a government commission headed by Vasyl Ivanovych Yevtukhov. The working body of that commission is an expert technical committee. Any contract or agreement is subject to review in this government commission—possibly proceeding from state priorities for the import of this or that type of product for military purposes to this or that country.

[Zhurets] Ukraine potentially has very large capabilities for the offering of military-technical services at the international level. But what will Ukroboronservis be directly engaged in in the future?

[Sharapov] All of our activity could be divided into five areas.

The first is the immediate organization of the import of military products, with a regard for state interests and the interests of the Ministry of Defense. These questions must be resolved through state rather than commercial structures.

The second area of our activity is the organization of pre-sale preparation. Hardware from the Ministry of Defense, after all, used to be sold at discount prices. Why? Because 100 percent of the value of the final military item included the documentation, its servicing and upgrading at customer enterprises, monitoring the status of that item for some time interval, and the training of specialists in mastering the hardware. That is what makes up 100 percent of the value of a military item. If one of those components is lacking, then the price is lower. We used to sell just the bare item; moreover, in unprepared form, without pre-sale preparation. The intermediary organizations that were engaged in the sale of weapons were interested only in commissions. They grabbed them and left. Since long-term contractual obligations were lacking, the partner also began to conduct his relations with us on a one-time basis for his part. And his will began to dictate: I will buy this, I will not buy that. And we lowered the prices a lot, not a little. We thus have to sell military items today at the maximum possible prices, if not at full price, under today's conditions, along with their documentation, service support and upgrades.

Third. Sixty percent of the activity of our repair plants was oriented toward export deliveries. The production mechanisms operate in such a way, however, that this activity should be planned for a long-term period. We will otherwise not be able to resolve the issue of component parts, we will not be able to obtain any specialists. We thus want to assume responsibility for organizing the major overhauls of military hardware at our own enterprises, both in the interests of the foreign customer and in the interests of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. This work could also be performed at customer enterprises with the participation of our specialists, our own constituent items and our own technologies. We will now be resolving these issues.

Fourth. As regrettable as it is to admit, the means of state monitoring the sending of military specialists and specialists from defense fields abroad have been lost today. The Soviet Union used to have a special authorized body, and it used to be known a full year ahead of time where and what positions would be required at which plants. That monitoring is lacking today, and the enterprises have begun to resolve these questions themselves in earnest. But certain international rules exist. There is

no treaty on military-technical collaboration with any country, and if a specialist has gone there anyway, he has gone as a private individual. But since he is working there in a defense field, he is not a defense specialist but rather a hired employee. The state does not stand behind him. These matters must be straightened out, resolving the questions of insurance and social security etc.

A fifth area of the activity of Ukroboronservis entails the use of Ukrainian design institutes, planning and design bureaus and military projects that have been working abroad. We have that base, and the documentation as well. We are prepared to modernize not only the hardware itself at those enterprises, but also to prepare and upgrade the means of producing that hardware. We have data on which countries have defense enterprises built by the former Soviet Union with the assistance of our Ukrainian specialists, we know the production capacity of those enterprises, we know their products and what must additionally be supplied there, how to upgrade the plant so that it will produce contemporary products. This is a huge amount of work, which costs a great deal. Just one page of documentation, for example, and this is an ordinary piece of paper, costs almost 14 dollars. And it would be a shame not to make use of that source.

[Zhurets] But today, as I understand it, the principal hopes of Ukroboronservis are linked with the hardware and weapons that are held by, or are at the immediate disposal of, the Ministry of Defense or the other power ministries.

[Sharapov] The situation has taken shape in unpleasant fashion for Ukraine today. We can make a comprehensive delivery of weapons only in rough fashion. One hundred percent fulfillment is possible only allowing for deliveries from Russia, Belarus and other countries. We are thus counting on coordinating interaction with a regard for the capabilities of the Ministry of Defense. And then life will show what we are worth. Although, we will of course not be able to get by in the future without a defense industry.

[Zhurets] But won't the Ministry of Defense itself get at least some of the funds from the sale of the weaponry and equipment? All of it, after all, has to go to the state budget under prevailing legislation, and then it will be resolved how that money will be used. We have, as they say, already gone through that. Even though the money received from the sale of military hardware has been promised to be allocated for the construction of housing for the military, there is not yet one more apartment. Will something similar happen this time as well?

[Sharapov] The funds that we earn must be allotted first and foremost to strengthening our defensive capabilities and to financing the defense complex of Ukraine. Since the customer for the defense complex in any country is the Ministry of Defense first and foremost, that money should be returned at least partly to the Ministry of Defense through the enterprises in the defense industry.

[Zhurets] Ukroboronservis has just gotten onto its feet. Is there anything you can say regarding concrete results anyway?

[Sharapov] Contracts have been concluded in the last two weeks for thirty million dollars. It is entirely realistic that this could reach 100 million dollars by the end of the year. The problem is just how to fulfill those contracts under contemporary conditions.

[Zhurets] Thank you for the interview.

Legal Changes Needed To Combat Strategic Exports

PM2704094594 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 26 Apr 94 p 4

[Interview with Major General Vyacheslav Saltaganov by unidentified ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent; place, date not given: "Passion for Profit Knows No Bounds, Including State Bounds"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The inoffensive pilferers whom the Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation Department used to combat have today become respectable businessmen who even sell strategic raw materials abroad. How are law-enforcement bodies combating this? Major General Vyacheslav Saltaganov, chief of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] Main Directorate for Economic Crimes, answered ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI's questions.

[Saltaganov] Commercial structures are increasingly frequently involved in dubious deals with strategic raw materials and derive tremendous profits from this. Naturally, considerable numbers of thefts are committed in areas where the safekeeping of material assets is not properly supervised. And bad management at industrial enterprises creates loopholes for criminals to engage in theft. What is more, the activity of joint ventures with foreign firms considerably facilitates uncontrolled exports. They export raw materials, semimanufactures, and goods that others have produced, portraying them as their own output. Regrettably, steps taken at state level to regulate export-import currency operations are not, in our view, making it possible to ensure effective supervision of their implementation.

[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI] What steps is the MVD taking?

[Saltaganov] The efforts of law-enforcement bodies alone are not enough here. The problem must be resolved at legislative level. Organizational measures are also necessary. Thus, the Federal Service for Currency Export Controls was recently set up. This structure now has to register all foreign economic operations without fail. What is more, we consider it advisable at legislative level to formulate and introduce into the system for the declaration of income a clause whereby the possibility of investments [using money] obtained by illegal criminal means would be precluded. We also consider it necessary

to make amendments and additions to Article 78 of the Criminal Code, which provides for the thesis "for contraband" with regard to describing actions linked with the illegal export of raw materials, output, and goods via Russia's prescribed customs border in the absence of state borders in most of the former Union republics.

Need To Adapt To Foreign Arms Markets Seen

PM2704132994 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Apr 94 p 5

[Aleksandr Sychev report: "How the T-80 Tank Lost Swedish Contract to the Leopard-2"]

[Excerpts] In September 1993, at the request of the Swedish Ministry of Defense and with the permission of the Russian Government, two T-80U tanks (pictured above) were sent to undergo tests in Sweden. In March 1994 these war machines were returned to the Motherland. For the first time Russian heavy weaponry had been shown in the West and viewed in principle as a possible option for the reequipment of two tank and three mechanized brigades.

When the Russian tanks arrived in Sweden, the search for a replacement for the obsolete Strv-103 produced by the Swedish concern Bofors since the sixties, and its British contemporary, the Centurion, was into its third year. The American M1A2 Abrams tank, the West German Leopard 2K Improved (pictured above), and the French Leclerc had undergone tests.

Four hundred tanks are liable for replacement. The Swedish parliament "okayed" 200 tanks and authorized the expenditure of correspondingly less money—around 1 billion kronor (approximately \$150 million). The discrepancy between the military's ideal and the country's capabilities forced the Ministry of Defense to search for a modern, high-class tank which would serve for the following 30 years and would be as advantageous as possible from the point of view of price and other contract terms. Therefore, when the T-80U first appeared at a weapons exhibition in Abu Dhabi, the Swedes decided to test it too. From the price viewpoint—roughly \$3 million—the tank was of undoubted interest.

However, it was not possible to complete the tests. The government decided to purchase the West German Leopards. Judging by the haste with which the choice was made and the attempts to play down the properties of the T-80, the decision was dictated primarily by political considerations. Swedish Defense Minister Anders Bjork stated, in particular, that the Russian tank could not be operated by servicemen taller than 1.65 meters, and that such people are hard to find in Sweden; also that the tank crew's loader could have his arms torn off, although in fact this process is fully automated...

Incidentally, the FRG and France demonstrated how arms deals should be conducted. High-ranking government delegations from Bonn and Paris came thick and

fast to Stockholm and Skovde, where the tank test site is located. According to rumors, the Germans brought with them around one-and-a-half tonnes of various documentation and advertisements for the Leopard, and the French around three tonnes. The French businessmen opened a promotions office in Sweden, hiring retired Swedish generals to work there, and spent around \$5 million on pushing Leclerc. [passage omitted]

The arms market has become crowded, and in order to take a prominent place in it we need to trade in a new way, like the French and Germans. The reform of the arms trade in Russia which, it seemed, had begun with the president's edict on setting up the the Rosvooruzheniye firm, appears to have gone no further. At any rate, the attitude of the country's leadership toward trade has not changed. We expect multibillion revenues for the treasury from it, but we do not offer our businessmen political support abroad. Not one delegation came to see the T-80 tanks in Sweden. And organizing a temporary mission with the hire of local military or establishing joint production in Sweden are completely out of the question.

Nor should help be expected even from our embassies. According to the accounts of people in the know who visited Chile, the Russian Embassy in that country did the minimum possible during preparation for the arms exhibition held there, which was to have opened up the Latin American continent—America's backyard—to Russian arms.

In Sweden the T-80 tanks justified the resources spent on them and showed what they are capable of, although they were driven by Swedish crews, who learned this skill quickly. Even at the preparatory stage the meticulous Swedes submitted 500 pages of questions, and these were answered by almost a dozen Russian research institutes. The tank confirmed all the answers at the test site.

The tanks drove through ravines and snowdrifts near the Polar Circle itself. In six months the tanks did not once fail to make the grade. "According to my observations, the military were pleased with the T-80," said Aleksandr Vonsovskiy, an expert of the Rosvooruzheniye state company who recently received an award for commercial successes. "Our tank is better than the other machines and is adapted to Swedish conditions. But even if we were to get as far as the commercial negotiations projected for 1995, we would not be able to offer terms comparable to the German and French terms."

In order to alter the prevailing trend of recent years toward the decline of Russian arms exports (they fell by 83 percent in comparable prices from 1988 through 1992 and amount roughly to \$2 billion) we must first of all change many things with regard to this business, and also resolve the problem of the compatibility of Western and Russian armaments standards, which will otherwise hold back the access of complex Russian technology to Western markets. The differences are so great that the acquisition of the T-80U tanks by the Swedes would

mean for them additional multimillion expenditure to restructure their whole material-technical base.

Yet there is interest in our military output. The FRG has a successful sideline in selling Russian equipment inherited from the GDR Army. The Swedes, incidentally, purchased large quantities of the MTLB combination prime mover-carrier from the FRG, and plan to buy spare parts for it from Russia.

SECURITY SERVICES

Border Troops 'Putina' Exercise to Control Poaching

94UM0376B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Major Anatoliy Prokopyev and Lieutenant Colonel Anatoliy Stasovskiy: "Russia Will Not Recon- cile Itself To Robbery. 'Putina' Will Stop Poachers"]

[Text] The border troops "are not saber rattling" in Russian territorial waters in the Far East as the mass media, especially the Japanese mass media, are attempting to portray it. Servicemen have been legally granted the right to utilize all of the tools at their disposal, including weapons, to put a stop to poaching. Russian Border Troops Commander-in-Chief Colonel-General Andrey Nikolayev stated that to an ITAR-TASS correspondent while stressing that his subordinates are conducting a strict policy to put a stop to the illegal activities of foreign boats. He noted that the President of Russia supports the position of the border troops for the full observance of the law in the country's territorial waters.

Recently, we have become accustomed to reports on the entry of Japanese fishing boats into Russian territorial waters to poach fish. According to official data, the number of such violations has increased by a factor of 3.5-4 in 1993, in contrast to 1990. And although the Russian border guards, who are experiencing great difficulties in logistics-technical support due to the well-known economic situation in the country, have been able to observe approximately 140 foreign fishing boats and to fine poachers a sum of more than 21 million rubles and over 100,000 U.S. dollars in 199, so far, their efforts are a drop in the sea. These fines have hardly made up for the damage from more than 7,500 pirate entries into Russia's territorial waters.

But then again, we can explain the definite impunity of violators not only through the problems in logistics-technical support, due to which border troops maritime units and aircraft have been compelled to reduce their activities (for example, last year the United States had 3.2 ships per 100,000 square kilometers of economic zone, Japan had 8.2, and Russia had 2.1), but also through the obvious delay in the adoption of the laws "On the Russian Federation's Exclusive Economic Zone" and "On the Russian Federation's Continental

Shelf", the drafts of which were developed by the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources and Roskomrybolovstvo [RF Committee on Fishing] with the participation of the RF Border Troops in execution of a Russian Presidential edict and were sent to the legislators for review. Incidentally, it is the drafts of these laws that stipulate more precise fine sanctions and the possibility for the RF Border Troops to utilize a certain percentage of these fines for their official purposes.


And yet the absence of the laws is not grounds to silently observe the systematic plundering of Russia's fishing wealth. This year, on the eve of the fishing season, the Federal Border Service, along with interested ministries and departments, have begun to develop Operation "Putina-94" [Fishing Season-94] and to search for methods to implement it. But, according to expert assessments, no matter how large they are, they will definitely pay for themselves many times over.

A decision has been made that Operation "Putina-94", the goal of which is to put a stop to illegal fishing by foreign boats in the Pacific Ocean region, will begin on 20 April and will occur in stages until October of this year. Besides Border Troops ships, aircraft and coastal surveillance systems, Naval forces (seven ships), RF

Committee on Fishing patrol vessels, and State Customs Committee and Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources specialists will participate in it. In a word, the forces are more impressive than ever before. But there is already no other solution...

Incidentally, Japanese fishermen (read poachers) have learned about the operation beforehand that is called upon to put pressure on them. This is certainly how we can explain why they have recently stepped up their activities. So, just from 26 March through 1 April and only in the Southern Kurile direction (Izmena Strait and Tanfilyev and Anuchin islands), 49 Japanese boats undertook attempts to poach. The schooners penetrated up to 55 cable lengths (one cable length is approximately 200 meters) into Russian territorial waters.

In the words of RF Border Troops Maritime Forces Commander Rear Admiral Nikolay Kudinov, for the time being the border troops are refraining from employing extreme measures. Of course, humaneness is a needed thing but there is still the hope that this time we will not get by with only the next, unknown in number, MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] statement to the Japanese side, that the possibility will appear to use force as other states do in their territorial waters. The poachers have finally cast off all restraints: They do not react to



signals to halt, they cover the side numbers of boats; they, as a rule, act villainously at night and they manage to destroy material evidence prior to the arrival of border troops helicopters. Yes, they are far from innocuously nibbling. In Rear Admiral Kudinov's opinion, the actions of the Japanese boats are being coordinated and controlled from the shore and, in the process, they take into account the location of Russian border troops ships and aircraft.

It is noteworthy that the poachers' schooners have been well adapted for "wolf-like" swoops into our territorial waters. They have excellent navigation equipment, they are equipped with computers and they are maneuverable. Maneuverability also helps them to feel quite confident in themselves even under conditions of a complex ice situation (up to 4-5 balls).

In short, Operation "Putina-94" is needed like air. Each day of delay with its initiation will inflict enormous damage. From the many figures we have gathered, we think that the most convincing—is that Japanese poachers fish out \$160 million worth of crabs alone per

year! Incidentally, that is a very modest assessment. Because it was made by the Japanese themselves.

But then again, the problem is much broader than just putting a stop to poaching in our territorial waters. It is also whether or not we, having established monitoring of fishing, will be able to conduct our own fishing for fish and crabs in these waters using our own men and equipment, in these waters that have been designated by and that are so familiar for Japanese fishermen? That is not an idle question. The proposals to sell fish to the Japanese that are being increasingly loudly stated today are certainly well thought out. How? Quite legally: By increasing their quota to catch fish in Russian territorial waters for hard currency. In a word, even in this case the border guards will not be standing idly by: Along with fish conservation personnel, they could carry out monitoring and continue to defend Russia's economic interests in this region. This decision seems to be more civilized. But for now...

Yesterday alone, RF Border Troops aircraft recorded 17 violations of the coastal waters of our seas.

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